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STATE INCOME TAXATION OF
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL
CORPORATIONS: REFLECTIONS ON
MOBIL, EXXON, AND H.R. 5076
Walter Hellerstein *
The state tax field is enjoying a renaissance of sorts. The
Supreme Court has displayed a renewed interest in the area, handing
down an unusual number of significant decisions addressed to the
constitutional restraints on state tax power. I State courts have exhib-
ited a similar revival of interest in these problems through an out-
pouring of uncharacteristically thoughtful opinions concerning state
taxation of multistate and multinational enterprise.2  Congress,
whose concern with state taxation of interstate and foreign com-
merce has been sporadic, 3 is again considering legislation that would
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia; A.B. 1967, Harvard University; J.D.
1970, University of Chicago. - Ed. The author would like to thank Ellen R. Jordan and
Michael Wells for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
I. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (announcing
test for validity of state taxes on foreign commerce); United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate
Tax Commn., 434 U.S. 452 (1978) (sustaining constitutionality of Multistate Tax Compact);
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (repudiating doctrine that states
cannot tax the privilege of doing interstate business); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276 (1976) (establishing new analytical framework for determining validity of state taxes on
imports). See generally W. Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Supreme Court: Towarda More
Un4ied.Approach to Constitutional.Adjudication?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1426 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Quails v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 266 Ark. 207, 585 S.W.2d 18 (1979):
Grace & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, - Mass. -, 393 N.E.2d 330 (1979); Budget Rent-
A-Car of Wash.-Or., Inc. v. Multnomah County, 287 Or. 93, 597 P.2d 1232 (1979).
3. Prior to 1959, Congress had not exercised its commerce power to legislate in the state tax
field, although it had enacted legislation with respect to the power of the states to tax federal
instrumentalities. See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 41, 13 Stat. Ill (codified, as
amended, at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976)). In 1959, Congress for the first time passed legislation
limiting the power of the states to tax interstate commerce. See Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L.
No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976)). See note I1 infra. Since 1959,
Congress has enacted five additional pieces of legislation limiting state tax authority under .its
commerce power. In each case, the legislation was narrow in scope. See 15 U.S.C. § 391
(1976) (prohibiting states from imposing electrical energy taxes discriminating against out-of-
state purchasers); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(d) (1976) (prohibiting states from imposing stock transfer
taxes when the only nexus between the state and the transaction is the presence of a transfer
agent); 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976) (prohibiting states from imposing user charges in connection
with the carriage of persons in air commerce); 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1978) (prohibiting states
from taxing railroad property more heavily than other industrial and commercial property);
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 92-296, § 31, 94 Stat. 793 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 11503a) (prohibiting states from taxing motor carrier property more heavily than other in-
dustrial and commercial property). Congress has from time to time held hearings on proposed
legislation much broader in scope. See, ag., Interstate Taxation, S. 2173: Hearings Before the
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:113
limit state taxing authority in these domains. 4 Even the executive
branch, which seldom intervenes in state tax controversies that do
not involve the federal government's own tax liability, has become
embroiled in the broad conflict regarding the appropriate scope of
state tax power. 5 The states, acting independently and through the
Multistate Tax Commission, 6 have been intensifying their efforts to
tax interstate and international business. 7 And corporate taxpayers,
whose dollars are ultimately the focus of all of this activity, have
become increasingly vocal in seeking relief from state taxing schemes
they regard as unduly burdensome. 8
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1977-1978); State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce: Hearings on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce Before the Subcomm.
on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); Interstate Taxation Act: Hearings on H.R. 11798 Before the Special Subcomm. on State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966). Bills growing out of these broader proposals were passed by the House in 1968, H.R.
2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. Rec. 14,423 (1968), and in 1969, H.R. 7906, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 17,315 (1969), but they died in the Senate. See 114 CoNG. REC.
14,432-33 (1968) and 115 CoNG. REC. 17,323 (1969).
4. H.R. 7163, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6654, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R.
6625, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 1778, 96th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1979); S. 1688, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Hearings have been held on many of these proposals. CoalSeverance Taxes: Hearings on H.R.
6625, H.R. 6654, and H.R. 7163 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); State Taxation of
Foreign Source Income: Hearing on H.R. 5076 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as House Foreign Source Income HearingP" State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce and Worldwide Corporate Income: Hearing on S. 983 and S.
1688 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Senate Foreign Source Income
Hearing].
5. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979) (United States
argued and filed brief as amicus curiae); House Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4,
at 3-11 (statement of Hon. Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy); Senate Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4, 38-55 (statement of Hon. Donald
C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy); Tax Treaties with the United
Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of the Philippines: Hqarings Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-40 (1977) (statement of Hon. Laurence
N. Woodworth, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy) [hereinafter cited as Tax
Treaty Hearings].
6. The Multistate Tax Commission is the administrative agency of the Multistate Tax
Compact, whose purposes include the promotion of accuracy, equity, uniformity and conven-
ience in the state tax treatment of multistate and multinational businesses. Multistate Tax
Compact art. I, reproduced in [1980] 1 STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH) T 351. There are presently 19
member states and 10 associate member states of the Compact. Id. The constitutionality of
the Compact was sustained in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commn., 434 U.S.
452 (1978).
7. See Hansen, Business v. Nonbusiness Income of Large Multinational Corporations Under
UDITPA, 57 TAXES 366 (1979); W. Hellerstein, Construing the Uniform Division of Incomefor
Tax Purposes Act: Relections on the Illinois Supreme Court's Reading of the "Throwback"
Rule, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 768 (1978); Scheele, State Taxation of Intangible Income of Multi.
state-Multinational Corporations, 57 TAXES 678 (1979).
8. See House Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4; Senate Foreign Source Income
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Congress has rarely limited state tax power;9 existing limitations
have been shaped largely by the Supreme Court. However, the
Court's recent decisions have generally afforded states substantial
leeway in taxing interstate business,' 0 and experience suggests that
Congress can be persuaded to act in the climate created by such deci-
sions. Congress enacted the most important piece of federal legisla-
tion restricting state tax authority as a direct response to a Supreme
Court decision that allegedly construed state tax power so expan-
sively as to cripple interstate business. I Moreover, the Court in its
recent opinions has invited Congress to act if it is unhappy with the
Court's hands-off attitude.12
The Court's two most recent decisions delineating the constitu-
tional constraints on state taxation of interstate and foreign com-
merce should be viewed against this background. In Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Commissioner of Taxes 13 and Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Depart-
ment of Revenue,' 4 the Court upheld state income taxes imposed on
multistate and multinational corporations. The opinions reflect a
generous view of state taxing authority. Because they explore a
number of sensitive issues that have been brewing in the state courts
and administrative agencies for years, the opinions are important in
their own right. They assume additional importance because they
Hearing, supra note 4; Interstate Taxation: Hearings on S. 2173 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1977-1978); Tax Treaty Hearings, supra note 5.
9. See note 3 supra.
10. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Washington Revenue Dept. v.
Stevedoring Assn., 435 U.S. 734 (1978); National Geographic Socy. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976). But see Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
441 U.S. 434 (1979); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Commn., 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
11. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86-272, tit. I, §§ 101-104, 73 Stat. 555-56 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 381-384), was a specific response to the Supreme Court's decision in Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Northwestern held that a state
could constitutionally impose a nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned net income tax upon a
foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in the taxing state. A mere
seven months after Northwestern, Congress enacted legislation establishing a minimum thresh-
old of intrastate activities that must be exceeded by a foreign corporation in a state before that
state may subject such a corporation to a tax measured by net income. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976).
See generally Note, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Public Law 86-272, 46 VA. L. REv.
297 (1960). One of the other pieces of federal legislation limiting state tax authority under
Congress's commerce power, see note 3 supra, was likewise a direct reaction to a Supreme
Court decision. In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707 (1972), the Court upheld state enplaning charges as reasonable amounts charged to
defray the costs of building or maintaining airport facilities used by the passengers. Congress
responded by prohibiting the states from imposing user charges in connection with the carriage
of persons in air commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976).
12. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1978); Washington Revenue
Dept. v. Stevedoring Assn., 435 U.S. 734, 749 (1978).
13. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
14. 100 S. Ct. 2109 (1980).
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contribute to a climate that may lead Congress to take away from the
states what the Court has apparently allowed them.
The purpose of this Article is twofold: first, to analyze the Mobil
and Exxon decisions; second, to consider the congressional reaction
they may engender. Because the terrain that this Article covers may
be unfamiliar to some readers, a few further words of introduction
may be appropriate.
Taken together, the Mobil and Exxon decisions dealt with the
three methods of dividing a multijurisdictional corporation's income
among the states - specific allocation, separate accounting and ap-
portionment by formula. 15 Each method provides a different solu-
tion to the problem of determining the portion of the income of
multistate businesses that should be taxable by any one state.
Specific allocation traces income to the state of its putative single
source and includes the income in that state's tax base.' 6 This
method is employed principally for the attribution of income from
property, with the "source" of the income generally following the
location of the property. Thus, many states specifically allocate the
income from real and tangible personal property, such as rents from
real estate and oil and mineral royalties, to the state where the un-
derlying property is located. 17 With respect to income from intangi-
ble property, whose location for tax purposes may not be readily
apparent, the states generally allocate the income to the taxpayer's
commercial domicile i8 or to the state in which the intangible is uti-
lized. Thus, many states specifically allocate interest and dividend
income to the state of the taxpayer's commercial domicile,' 9 while
income from patents and copyrights may be allocated to the state
where they are utilized.20
States have largely rejected specific allocation in the context of
income from sales of interstate manufacturing and mercantile busi-
15. See, e.g., SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP.
No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 157-216 (1964).
16. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 398 (4th ed.
1978).
17. See id. at 399, 490-91.
18. "Commercial domicile" is the state where a corporation's affairs are controlled and
managed. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 211-12 (1936).
19. See UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 7. As of early 1981,
more than half of the states levying corporate income taxes had in substance adopted the act.
STATE AND LOCAL TAXES (All States Unit) (P-H) 1046 (1979).
20. See UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PURPOSES ACT § 8. See also note 19
supra.
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nesses, for several reasons.2' There are inherent difficulties in identi-
fying the particular source of income generated by sales of multistate
and multinational businesses. Consider, for example, the problem of
determining the source of income generated by the sale of an item
manufactured in State A, packaged and stored in State B, and sold
in State C by an enterprise managed in State D. The consequences
of identifying such a source for purposes of specific allocation would
be to assign much of the enterprise's income tax base to a single state
despite legitimate claims by other states to a share of that tax base.
As a result, the states have developed two alternative methods of
determining the portion of a multistate business' net income that
should be included in the measure of each state's tax: separate ac-
counting and apportionment.22
Under the separate accounting method, a certain geographic or
functional area of an interstate business is treated separately from
the rest of the business. Income is computed as if the activities of the
business were confined to that geographic or functional area.23
When income taxation of corporations began in this country, sepa-
rate accounting for multistate operations was regarded as the most
precise method of determining the income derived from various
states. Under early state income tax laws, corporations were permit-
ted to treat separately the income earned in each state as long as they
maintained separate geographic accounting records that enabled
them to ascertain that income with reasonable accuracy.24
Under the apportionment method, a formula is employed for di-
viding the income of a multistate business among the states in which
the business is conducted.25 The rationale for using a formula for
this purpose is that many enterprises conduct multistate businesses
whose income cannot be satisfactorily identified on a geographic ba-
sis by either specific allocation or separate accounting. Because of
this difficulty, states have developed apportionment formulas as a
rough means of attributing a reasonable share of the income tax base
of such a multistate business - referred to as a "unitary business" 26
- to the taxing state.27 The most widely adopted formula for attrib-
uting the income of a unitary business among states employs three
21. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 399.
22. See Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept in theAllocation ofIncome, 12 HASTINGS
LJ. 42, 43 (1960).
23. See id.
24. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 432.
25. See id. at 399.
26. For a definition of unitary business, see note 50 infra.
27. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 399-400; note 51 infra.
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factors: real and tangible personal property, payroll and sales. By
averaging the ratios of the taxpayer's property, payroll and sales
within the state to its property, payroll and sales throughout the busi-
ness, the formula yields a fraction that can be applied to the tax-
payer's net income to determine the portion taxable by the state.
In Mobil, an oil company challenged Vermont's reliance on for-
"mulary apportionment of income received by the company in the
form of dividends from subsidiaries and affiliates doing business
abroad. Mobil argued that, for tax purposes, the due process
clause 28 and the commerce clause 29 of the Constitution required that
its foreign source dividend income be specifically allocated to the
state of its commercial domicile, New York. The Court rejected Mo-
bil's constitutional challenges. The Mobil decision recognized the
power of the states to tax an apportioned share of the foreign source
dividends of a unitary business but failed to delineate specific consti-
tutional constraints on that power to ensure that such apportion-
ments are fair.
In Exxon, an oil company relied on the due process clause and
the commerce clause to challenge Wisconsin's formulary apportion-
ment of all the company's operating income. Exxon argued that
Wisconsin should apply a separate functional accounting method
rather than apportionment and that it should include income only
from Exxon's marketing activities - the sole function carried on in
Wisconsin - in Exxon's tax base. The Court rejected Exxon's chal-
lenges in a decision that, like Mobil, defined state power expansively.
Exxon implies that a state can tax an apportioned share of all the
operating income of a business conducted in part within its borders
as long as the apportionment formula is fair and the business is uni-
tary. Yet, Exxon failed to define limits on the scope of a unitary
business.
By broadly construing state tax authority without providing spe-
cific content to the constitutional restraints upon its exercise, the
Court's opinions in Mobil and Exxon reflect a continuing attitude of
judicial restraint in this area that has countenanced assertions of ex-
tensive taxing power by some states. California, for example, relies
on the "worldwide combination" method to tax as a single unitary
business numerous loosely connected corporations that are scattered
around the globe. In the wake of Mobil, Exxon, and the increasing
use of taxation methods like that employed by California, Congress
While the discussion in the text is addressed to apportionment of income, the underlying the-
ory is applicable to apportionment of other tax bases as well. See id. at 397-99.
28. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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may very well act to limit state taxation of the income of multijuris-
dictional corporations. Accordingly, after analyzing Mobil and Ex-
xon, this Article examines H.R. 5076, a recent congressional
proposal to limit state income taxation that has generated considera-
ble interest and is supported in some quarters as a necessary antidote
to these decisions.
I. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes: CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN
SOURCE DIVIDENDS
3 0
Vermont imposes an income tax upon every corporation doing
business in the state,31 including the Mobil Oil Corporation. Mobil
is the world's third largest integrated oil company32 and does busi-
ness in more than forty states and in many foreign countries. Mo-
bil's worldwide activities include the exploration, production,
transportation, refining, distribution, and sale of petroleum and pe-
troleum products. In foreign countries, Mobil acts largely through
wholly and partly owned subsidiaries and affiliates, some of which
are incorporated abroad and some of which are incorporated domes-
tically in states other than Vermont. None of these subsidiaries or
affiliates conducts business in Vermont, and Mobil manages its hold-
ings in these corporations from its headquarters in New York, its
state of incorporation. Mobil's activities in Vermont are limited to
the wholesale and retail marketing of petroleum and petroleum
products.33
Under the constraints of the commerce and due process clauses,
Vermont may tax only the portion of a corporation's income that is
fairly related to activities carried on by the corporation within the
state.34 Vermont uses the apportionment method to tax the income
of corporations like Mobil, which derive income from "business or
activity conducted both within and without th[e] state.'' 35 To appor-
30. In accordance with the Michigan Law Review's policy of indicating any personal
interest, however remote, that an author had in litigation he discusses in an article, I wish to
disclose that my father, Jerome R. Hellerstein, was counsel of record in the Mobil case and
that I was of counsel to the Iowa Manufacturers Association, et at., which submitted a brief
amici curiae supporting the state in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), discussed
in text at notes 113-29, 180-83, and 194-204 infra.
31. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5811(15), 5832 (1970 & Supp. 1979).
32. See FORTUNE MAGAZINF, Aug. 11, 1980, at 190. Mobil was also the nation's third
largest industrial corporation in 1979. Id., May 5, 1980, at 276.
33. 445 U.S. at 428.
34. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
35. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5833 (1970 & Supp. 1979).
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tion a "fair and equitable portion" 36 of the income, Vermont em-
ploys the three-factor formula of property, payroll and sales.37 The
state applies the fraction 38 yielded by the formula to the taxpayer's
federal taxable income (with minor modifications39) to determine the
portion of the income taxable by Vermont.
The dispute between Mobil and Vermont centered on the ques-
tion whether Vermont was constitutionally entitled to include within
Mobil's tax base, before apportionment, dividends that Mobil re-
ceived from its subsidiaries and affiliates whose income derived from
foreign sources.40 Mobil claimed that the inclusion of these divi-
dends in its apportionable tax base was prohibited by the due pro-
cess and commerce clauses and by established federal policy toward
foreign commerce. The Vermont Supreme Court had rejected these
contentions and sustained Vermont's power to impose an appor-
tioned tax upon income that included foreign source dividends re-
ceived by a corporation domiciled outside Vermont.4'
The stakes in the case were high, at least in relative terms. Mo-
bil's foreign source dividend income ranged from 80 to 120% of its
federal taxable income for the years in question.42 The exclusion of
such income from Mobil's apportionable tax base for Vermont tax
purposes had the effect of transforming substantial net income into
net losses for two of the three years at issue and into a small gain for
the third.43 Moreover, there was intense interest outside of Mobil's
Tax Department and the Vermont Attorney General's Office over
the question whether a nondomiciliary state possesses the constitu-
tional power to include in its apportionable tax base foreign source
dividends received by an American corporation doing business in
36. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5833 (1970 & Supp. 1979).
37. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5833 (1970 & Supp. 1979); see STATE AND LOCAL TAXES (All
States Unit) (P-H) 1046 (1980).
38. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5833 (1970 & Supp. 1979).
39. Modifications include the exclusion of income exempt from state taxation under fed-
eral law, see, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1976), and the exclusion of "grossed-up dividends" re-
quired to be taken into taxable income in connection with the foreign tax credit. I.R.C. § 78.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5811(18) (Supp. 1980).
40. These included dividends both from United States corporations earning their income
abroad, to the extent that such dividends were not eliminated from Mobil's federal taxable
income by the intercorporate dividend deduction, see 1.R.C. §§ 243-47, and from foreign cor-
porations earning their income abroad.
41. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 136 Vt. 545,394 A.2d 1147 (1978). Neither
Mobirs legal domicile (the state of its incorporation) nor its commercial domicile (the state
where its affairs are controlled and managed, see note 18 supra) was in Vermont.
42. See 445 U.S. at 430.
43. 445 U.S. at 430-31 n.6.
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the state.44
The Supreme Court upheld the levy.45 While the Court's holding
may be "extremely narrow" and "unexceptional," as i Justice Stevens
characterized it in dissent,46 Mobil nevertheless resolved several is-
sues that had long divided taxpayers and state taxing authorities, and
it has unmistakable implications for others that are a source of con-
tinuing controversy. As a result, this "unexceptional" case may en-
courage a far-reaching congressional response.
A. Due Process Clause Limitations on State Taxation
of Foreign Source Dividends
The due process clause imposes two restrictions on the states'
power to tax income generated by the activities of an interstate busi-
ness. First, there must be "some minimal connection between those
activities and the taxing State."47 Second, "the income attributed to
the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to 'values con-
nected with the taxing State' "-48 - that is, the state may tax only the
portion of a multistate corporation's income that is rationally related
to the activities thathe corporation conducts in that state.
For Vermont to include Mobil's foreign source dividend income
in its tax base, therefore, the first due process restriction required a
minimum connection, or nexus, between Vermont and the activities
that generated the dividends. That nexus was not obvious. Mobil's
subsidiary and affiliate corporations, which paid the dividends, con-
ducted none of their business in Vermont. And all of Mobil's activi-
ties relating to its stock holdings in these corporations, including the
receipt and management of the dividends themselves, also occurred
outside Vermont.49
Vermont relied on the unitary business principle for its minimum
44. The large number of amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court by both state and busi-
ness spokesmen attest to the outside interest in the case. Twenty states, represented in part by
the Multistate Tax Commission, see note 6 supra, supported Vermont as amici curiae. The
National Association of Manufacturers and the Committee on State Taxation of the Council
of State Chambers of Commerce supported Mobil as amici curiae. Standard Oil of California
filed an amicus brief supporting the State.
45. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
46. 445 U.S. at 449, 450.
47. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978). The Court had earlier referred to
this requirement as the "time-honored concept ... that due process requires some definite
link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property, or transaction it
seeks to tax." Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340-45 (1954).
48. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
49. Brief for Appellant at 9, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425
(1980).
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connection to Mobil's foreign source dividends.50 According to this
principle, when a multijurisdictional unitary business is doing busi-
ness within a state, that state has the required nexus to both the in-
state and out-of-state activities of the business, and is therefore enti-
tled to tax an apportioned share of all its income.5' Vermont
claimed that all the foreign source dividends at issue came from Mo-
bil's stockholdings in subsidiaries and affiliates that constituted inte-
gral parts of a worldwide unitary business carried on in part in
Vermont. 52 Furthermore, Vermont asserted that its power to include
all the income of the unitary business within Mobil's apportionable
tax base was not limited by the multinational, multicorporate form
in which the business was conducted, or by the form in which the
income was received.53 Vermont argued that Mobil's foreign source
dividends were therefore an element of its unitary business income
and that the state was entitled to tax an apportioned share.
Mobil claimed that the due process clause forbade Vermont from
including Mobil's foreign source dividends in its apportionable tax
base because the minimum connection between Vermont and Mo-
bil's foreign source dividends was lacking. Mobil agreed that the
unitary business principle can establish a taxing state's connection to
the out-of-state activities of corporations other than the corporate
taxpayer where all the corporations form a unitary business, and that
such a connection justifies the state's including income generated by
50. A unitary business may be defined as a single business conducted both within and
without the taxing state and whose tax base cannot be satisfactorily identified on a geographi-
cal basis. See G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 101
(2d ed. 1950).
51. See G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, supra note 50, at 100-02. The states resorted to ap-
portionment formulas because of the impracticability or impossibility of identifying the tax
base of a unitary business along geographic lines. See text at notes 25-27 supra. The Supreme
Court has generally approved of formulary apportionment as a rough means of attributing a
reasonable share of the tax base to the taxing state. See, e.g., Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1920). The question whether a particular business is uni-
tary (and its tax base apportionable) has often been a source of controversy, see, e.g., Bass,
Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commn., 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897), and delineation of the proper scope of a unitary
business has been the subject of scholarly commentary. See, e.g., G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLINO
supra; J. Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription
of Unitary Business, 21 NATL. TAX. J. 487 (1968); Keesling & Warren, supra note 22; Lavelle,
What Constitutes a Unitary Business, 25 S. CAL. TAX INST. 239 (1973); Rudolph, State Taxa-
tion of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Concept andAffiliated Corporate Groups, 25
TAx L. REv. 171 (1970); Comment, State Taxation ofMultinational Corporations, 50 CoLo. L.
REv. 499 (1979); Note, State Taxation of Unitary Businesses, 8 FORD URB. L.J. 819 (1980); see
also note 7 supra. The constitutional contours of the unitary business are explored in more
detail in connection with the Exxon case, discussed in part II infra.
52. Brief for Appellee at 16, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425
(1980).
53. Id. at 17.
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the entire multicorporate enterprise in the apportionable tax base.5 4
The company asserted, however, that if the unitary business princi-
ple is the predicate for the connection, then the multicorporate enter-
prise must be taxed on a combined (or "consolidated") basis.55
Under this approach 5 6 the tax base before apportionment consists of
the combined or consolidated income of all the corporations that
comprise the unitary business. 57 The property, payroll, sales or other
factors of all the corporations are taken into account in apportioning
to a state the share of the group's combined income subject to that
state's taxing power.5 8 Mobil argued that unless Vermont had taxed
Mobil on such a basis, the State could not rely on the unitary busi-
ness principle to establish its minimum connection t6 Mobil's foreign
source dividends.
Mobil showed that Vermont had not taxed it using a combined
approach. Under the combined approach, the apportionable income
of a group of corporations conducting a unitary business is the in-
come derived by members of the multicorporate unitary enterprise
from dealings with nonmembers of the group.59 Dividends paid by
one member of the group to other members are eliminated alto-
gether from the tax base. If Vermont had treated Mobil in this man-
ner, the controversy between them would never have arisen because
the intercorporate dividends at issue would not have been a compo-
nent of Mobil's apportionable tax base. Vermont, however, had
taxed an apportioned share of Mobil's intercorporate dividends.
Thus, Vermont had not taxed Mobil on a combined (or "consoli-
dated") basis, and, according to Mobil, Vermont consequently had
failed to treat Mobil as a unitary business - or more precisely, had
not done so in an analytically defensible manner.60
Instead, Vermont had taxed Mobil according to a separate com-
pany apportionment. Under this method, the taxing state takes into
account only the income of the taxpayer itself and only the tax-
payer's own apportionment factors.6' Vermont had taxed an appor-
tioned share of the dividends received from subsidiaries and
54. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2-3, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425 (1980).
55. Id. at 2-5, 10-12.
56. See generally J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 520-26.
57. See Keesling & Warren, supra note 22, at 59-64; Rudolph, supra note 51, at 194-200.
58. See Keesling & Warren, supra note 22, at 59-64; Rudolph, supra note 51, at 194-200.
59. See Keesling & Warren, supra note 22, at 59-64; Rudolph, supra note 51, at 194-200.
60. Reply Brief for Appellant at 1-15, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425 (1980).
61. Id. at 3.
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affiliates as income earned by Mobil as a separate company; the
State did not include the income earned by these subsidiaries and
affiliates in Mobil's tax base. Likewise, Vermont had apportioned
Mobil's income on the basis of the property, payroll and sales of
Mobil alone as a separate company, without taking into account the
factors of its subsidiaries and affiliates.
In essence, Mobil argued that Vermont could not treat the com-
pany and its subsidiaries and affiliates as a unitary business for pur-
poses of establishing the nexus for taxation of foreign source income,
while at the same time treating the company as separate for purposes
of apportionment. Because Vermont had treated it as a separate
company, Mobil asserted that Vermont's power under the due pro-
cess clause to include the disputed dividends in Mobil's apportiona-
ble tax base required that Vermont demonstrate its nexus to Mobil's
activities and operations as a separate company, 62 rather than as part
of a unitary business conducted in multicorporate form. Mobil ar-
gued that Vermont lacked this nexus with respect to Mobil's activi-
ties involving its foreign source dividends because Mobil held the
stocks and received the dividends outside Vermont, and there was no
link or connection between Vermont and the earnings out of which
the dividends were paid.63
The Supreme Court never had to address the question whether
Vermont had the requisite nexus to Mobil's foreign source dividends
by reference solely to Mobil's activities as a separate company.64
The Court found that Mobil had not pressed in a timely manner its
claim premised on the distinction between separate and combined
apportionment.65 It therefore permitted Vermont to rely on the uni-
tary business principle to establish its nexus to Mobil's foreign
source dividends even though Vermont had apportioned Mobil's in-
come on a separate company basis. It left open the question whether
a state that relies on the unitary business principle to justify its inclu-
62. Id. at 3-6.
63. Brief for Appellant at 9 and Appendix to the Court's opinion at A83, Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
64. Even if the Court had addressed the issues according to Mobil's formulation, it might
have found the necessary relationship between Mobil, viewed as a separate company, and its
subsidiaries and affiliates, to justify the inclusion of dividends from these corporations in Mo-
bil's apportionable Vermont tax base - on the ground, for example, that the dividends were
used to finance Mobil's sales operations in Vermont. The question whether such a relationship
should warrant the inclusion of dividends in the payee's apportionable tax base is itself a
subject of heated controversy. See Dexter, Taxation of Incomefrom Intangibles of Multistate.
Multinational Corporations, 29 VAND. L. REv. 401 (1976).
65. 445 U.S. at 441 n.15. The Court also observed there that the record was, in any event,
inadequate to dispose of these contentions.
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sion in the apportionable tax base of income generated by a mul-
ticorporate enterprise will be compelled to tax that enterprise on a
combined basis.66
As the Court approached the case, then, Vermont's power to in-
clude Mobil's foreign source dividends in the company's apportiona-
ble tax base turned on the question whether such dividends
constituted income from a worldwide unitary business conducted in
part in Vermont. Observing that "the linchpin of apportionability in
the field of state income taxation is the unitary business principle," 67
the Court declared that Mobil had to demonstrate that its foreign
source dividend income "was earned in the course of activities unre-
lated to the sale of petroleum products in [Vermont]" 68 to establish
that such income was not subject to an apportioned tax in the state.
Since Mobil had claimed that Vermont could not apply the unitary
business principle because the State had never treated Mobil as a
unitary business, Mobil had presumed that it was irrelevant whether
the subsidiaries and affiliates from which it received foreign source
dividends were in fact part of a unitary enterprise. 69 As a result, it
never sought to prove that its subsidiaries and affiliates were not part
of a unitary business: 70
[A]ppellant has made no effort to demonstrate that the foreign opera-
tions of its subsidiaries and affiliates are distinct in any business or
economic sense from its petroleum sales in Vermont. Indeed, all indi-
cations in the record are to the contrary, since it appears that these
foreign activities are part of appellant's integrated petroleum enter-
prise. In the absence of any proof of discrete business enterprise, Ver-
mont was entitled to conclude that the dividend income's foreign
source did not destroy the requisite nexus with in-state activities.7 '
The Court reviewed the evidence Mobil had offered to prove a
lack of connection (on a separate company basis) between Vermont
and Mobil's activities involving its foreign source dividends. The
Court found that this evidence failed to show that Mobil's activities
involving these dividends constituted a business discrete from its sale
of petroleum in Vermont. In the Court's view, the fact that Mobil
received substantial income in the form of dividends did not require
Vermont to treat Mobil as conducting a separate holding company
66. 445 U.S. at 441 n.15.
67. 445 U.S. at 439 (footnote omitted).
68. 445 U.S. at 439.
69. Reply Brief for Appellant at 1-2, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425 (1980).
70. 445 U.S. at 435; Reply Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
71. 445 U.S. at 439-40.
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and investment business outside the state72 in the face of "the under-
lying economic realities of a unitary business. ' 73 Nor was the for-
eign source of the dividend income of significance for due process
purposes. The Court had long held that the states could include for-
eign source operating income in their apportionable tax base,74 and
it perceived no reason for a different result with respect to foreign
source dividend income, at least absent a showing that the business
activities of the payor corporations were unrelated to the in-state ac-
tivities of the payee.75 Under the Court's analysis, then, Mobil's due
process contention failed for want of proof.
Even if viewed exclusively in this light, the Mobil decision is sig-
nificant in establishing that the due process clause does not preclude
a state from including foreign source dividend income from subsidi-
aries and affiliates in the apportionable tax base of a nondomicil-
iary76 corporation.77 The multicorporate form of a business will not
by itself shield income distributed as dividends from state taxation if
such income is derived from a unitary business.78 The taxpayer must
72. See Brief for Appellant at 9, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425
(1980).
73. 445 U.S. at 441.
74. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commn., 266 U.S. 271 (1924). In Bass, the
taxpayer was engaged in the brewing and sale of ale. All of the brewing was done in England,
but the taxpayer sold some of its products in New York, which sought to impose a franchise
tax upon the corporation, measured by an apportioned share of its worldwide net income. The
taxpayer challenged the New York levy on due process and commerce clause grounds, claim-
ing, among other things, that because it had no net income for federal tax purposes, New York
was necessarily taxing income from business conducted outside the state. The Court re-
sponded:
[A]s the Company carried on the unitary business of manufacturing and selling ale, in
which its profits were earned by a series of transactions beginning with the manufacture in
England and ending in sales in New York and other places - the process of manufactur-
ing resulting in no profit until it ends in sales - the State was justified in attributing to
New York a just proportion of the profits earned by the Company from such unitary
business.
266 U.S. at 282.
75. 445 U.S. at 439.
76. Mobil was domiciled in New York and not Vermont. See note 41 supra.
77. For a discussion of the battle lines that were drawn over this proposition, see Dexter,
supra note 64.
78. The Court specifically addressed the intercorporate division of Mobils unitary busi-
ness:
Superficially, intercorporate division might appear to be a more attractive basis for
limiting apportionability. But the form of business organization may have nothing to do
with the underlying unity or diversity of business enterprise. Had appellant chosen to
operate its foreign subsidiaries as separate divisions of a legally as well as a functionally
integrated enterprise, there is little doubt that the income derived from those divisions
would meet due process requirements for apportionability. Transforming the same in-
come into dividends from legally separate entities works no change in the underlying
economic realities of a unitary business, and accordingly it ought not to affect the appor-
tionability of income the parent receives.
445 U.S. at 440-41 (citation and footnote omitted).
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demonstrate that economic substance underlies the formal distinc-
tions between separate corporate entities. Only if the income-gener-
ating activities of the payor corporations are "unrelated" to,7 9
"discrete" from,80 or "have nothing to do with"81 the activities of the
payee in the taxing state - that is, only in the absence of a unitary
business - does the due process clause require the state to exclude
from the payee's apportionable tax base dividends received from the
payor.
The Court failed, however, to address the second due process re-
striction on the states' power to tax income generated by the activi-
ties of an interstate business - the requirement of a rational
relationship between the income taxed and the in-state corporate ac-
tivities. As a result, serious doubts remain whether the income at-
tributed to Vermont by its apportionment formula was "rationally
related to 'values connected with the taxing state.' "82 The first un-
resolved issue is whether due process requires that a state, relying on
the unitary business principle to include income generated by a mul-
ticorporate enterprise in the apportionable tax base, must apportion
that income according to the combined approach, 83 or whether the
separate company approach may also be employed. 84 Assuming for
the moment that the due process clause permits Vermont to tax an
apportioned share of the dividend income Mobil receives from its
subsidiary and affiliate corporations (the separate company ap-
proach),85 the particular apportionment formula Vermont used
would still violate the clause's rational relation requirement. Ver-
mont sought to meet this requirement by providing for apportion-
ment of a share of Mobil's income pursuant to its three-factor
formula.8 6 The Supreme Court has approved of that formula "as a
rough, practical approximation of the distribution of either a corpo-
ration's sources of income or the social costs which it generates.
87
But the Court's remarks were directed to cases in which the factors
- real and tangible personal property, payroll and sales - were
rationally related to the operating income of the taxable corpora-
79. 445 U.S. at 439, 442.
80. 445 U.S. at 439.
81. 445 U.S. at 442.
82. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
83. This is what Mobil contended, see text at note 56 supra.
84. This was the approach that Vermont employed. See text at notes 59-60 supra.
85. Again, Vermont employed this approach in the case before the Court.
86. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5833 (1970 & Supp. 1979). See text at notes 20-22 supra.
87. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 561 (1965).
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tion.88 By contrast, Vermont was applying its formula to income
that, in form at least, derived from Mobil's investments in its subsidi-
aries and affiliates, not from its operations. When a corporation re-
ceives between 80 and 120% of its taxable income from intangible
property, it is anomalous - and perhaps grossly distorting89 - to
apportion such income by a formula that, among other things, takes
no account of intangible property.90 As Justice Stevens observed in
dissent:
Clearly, it is improper simply to lump huge quantities of investment
income that have no special connection with the taxpayer's operations
in the taxing State into the tax base and to apportion it on the basis of
factors that are used to allocate operating income.91
While Vermont, in assessing Mobil's tax liability, was not constitu-
tionally compelled to honor the form in which Mobil chose to con-
duct its business, the state should not be permitted to have it both
ways: to include in Mobil's apportionable tax base income from its
subsidiaries and affiliates operating abroad but to apportion such in-
come by factors reflecting only Mobil's own operations on a separate
company basis. Therefore, Vermont must adjust the apportionment
factors to comply with the due process requirement that the income
apportioned be "rationally related to 'values connected with the tax-
ing State.' ",92
To make this adjustment, Vermont might employ an apportion-
ment formula whose factors reflect the underlying business activities
of the dividend-paying corporations.93 For example, if a corporation
pays out all of its net income in dividends to the corporate taxpayer,
then all of the payor's property, payroll and sales would be included
as apportionment factors to apportion the taxpayer's income to the
state. On the other hand, if a corporation pays out only fifty percent
of its net income in dividends to the corporate taxpayer, then only
fifty percent of the payor's property, payroll and sales would be re-
flected in the payee's apportionment factors.94 In either case, assum-
88. See General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 561 (1965); Butler
Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 509 (1942).
89. See Rudolph, supra note 51, at 203. Cf. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Director of Div. of
Taxation, 45 N.J. 466, 494-99, 213 A.2d 1, 17-19 (1965) (application of three-factor formula to
tax base that includes receipts from foreign subsidiaries held to comply with due process, but
case remanded for consideration of adjustments to apportionment factors that would make
apportionment more equitable).
90. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 455-56.
91. 445 U.S. at 459 (footnote omitted).
92. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978).
93. See Peters, Sup. Ctr Mobil decision on multistate income apportionment raises new ques-
lions, 53 J. TAX. 36, 39 (1980).
94. Id.
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ing that the payor corporation carries on little or no activity in the
taxing state, taking account of the payor corporation's operations in-
creases the denominators of the apportionment formula and reduces
the percentage of the taxpayer's income apportioned to the state.95
Alternatively, Vermont might apply a special formula to the divi-
dend income that reflects only the activities of the payee corporation
relating to the management and disposal of its dividends. 96
These proposed adjustments to Vermont's separate company ap-
portionment presuppose that a state can first invoke the unitary busi-
ness principle to include income generated by a multicorporate
enterprise in its apportionable tax base, and then apportion that in-
come on a separate company basis. The issue remains, however,
whether a state that thus invokes the unitary business principle to
satisfy the nexus requirement may apportion the income on a sepa-
rate company basis or whether, to avoid the distortion of income, the
rational relationship requirement of due process demands that the
income and apportionment factors of the entire unitary business be
taken into account under a combined approach. In general, a state
may tax an apportioned share of all the income of a unitary business.
The Court in Mobil permitted Vermont to employ the separate com-
pany approach, and to include in Mobil's apportionable tax base the
dividends from Mobil's subsidiaries and affiliates, because the divi-
dends reflected the income that the subsidiaries and affiliates earned
as integral parts of the unitary business and because the income of
the subsidiaries and affiliates was not taxed directly.97 Adjusting
Vermont's apportionment factors to reflect the business activities of
the dividend-paying corporations would tighten the connection be-
tween the income and the dividends of the subsidiaries and affiliates,
and therefore a separate company approach that included such ad-
justments may be a constitutionally acceptable alternative to the
combined approach. But the dividends may still not accurately re-
flect the operating income of the payor corporations. 98 Conse-
quently, the combined approach, which includes the subsidiaries'
and affiliates' operating income in the apportionable tax base and
then apportions such income by factors that reflect the underlying
95. Cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 441 n.15 (1980) (com-
bined apportionment also increases the denominator and reduces the percentage of the tax-
payer's income apportioned to the state).
96. See Peters, supra note 93, at 39. This adjustment to Vermont's apportionment formula
might satisfy Justice Stevens's objections. See 445 U.S. at 449 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. 445 U.S. at 440.
98. Additional problems exist if the dividends are paid out of prior years' earnings or capi-
tal. Peters, supra note 93, at 39.
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operations of the subsidiaries and affiliates, is more justifiable ana-
lytically.
For the time being, however, the constitutional status of the com-
bined and separate company approaches remains unresolved. We
are left with an opinion explicitly confined "to the question whether
there is something about the character of income earned from invest-
ments in affiliates and subsidiaries operating abroad that precludes,
as a constitutional matter, state taxation of that income by the appor-
tionment method";99 and to a holding on the due process issue ex-
plicitly limited to the proposition that, on the record before it, such
income "is attributable to the parent and amenable to fair apportion-
ment." 00 It remains unclear whether the Court's refusal to confront
arguments premised on the distinction between separate and com-
bined apportionment truly reflects a misguided "litigation strat-
egy" 0l by Mobil (the company saved these arguments for its reply
briefl0 2), or rather the understandable reluctance of the Court to be-
come entangled in the complex and controversial web of issues they
raised. 0 3 By refusing to consider whether the resulting apportion-
ment was in fact fair and whether the combined approach or some
other modification in the apportionment formula would be required
to make it fair, the Court relegated to a footnote' °4 a constitutional
issue far more troublesome than the one it resolved.
B. Commerce Clause Limitations on State Taxation
of Foreign Source Dividends
The commerce clause provided Mobil with a constitutional de-
fense to Vermont's tax on its foreign source dividends that was dis-
tinct from its due process defense. 0 5 One of the limitations that the
Court has developed in delineating the restraints that the commerce
clause imposes on state tax power is the doctrine that a state tax un-
constitutionally burdens interstate commerce when it subjects an in-
terstate business to multiple taxation..not borne by. an intrastate
99. 445 U.S. at 434-35.
100. 445 U.S. at 441 n.15.
101. 445 U.S. at 434.
102. See 445 U.S. at 441 n.15.
103. See general y authorities cited in notes 7, 51 & 77 supra.
104. 445 U.S. at 441 n.15.
105. The commerce and due process clauses frequently provide alternative but substan-
tively indistinguishable bases for challenging the constitutionality of state apportionment for-
mulas. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Commn., 390 U.S. 317, 325 n.5
(1968).
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business.' 06 Mobil constructed a chain of interrelated propositions
to show that Vermont had violated this principle in taxing its foreign
source dividends. The company argued, first, that the state of its
commercial domicile 0 7 had the power to tax all of its dividends; sec-
ond, that the possible exercise of this power together with Vermont's
taxation of an apportioned share of Mobil's foreign source dividends
created the risk of multiple taxation; third, that this risk was the cri-
terion for determining whether Vermont's tax violated the commerce
clause's bar against multiple taxation; fourth, that even if a risk of
multiple taxation is constitutionally tolerable when only taxation of
interstate commerce is involved, it may be unconstitutional when it
involves taxation of foreign commerce; and finally, that Vermont's
power to tax even an apportioned share of Mobil's foreign source
dividends created such an intolerable risk. t08 While Mobil's some-
what attenuated commerce clause argument lacked the force of its
due process challenge, the Court's opinion rejecting it is nonetheless
significant for illuminating a number of controversial issues.
1. Multiple Taxation: Potential or Actual?
The Court first addressed the question whether the Vermont levy
imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce by sub-
jecting Mobil to a risk of multiple taxation not borne by a taxpayer
conducting all of its business within a single state. 10 9 Vermont's
claim to an apportioned share of Mobil's dividends threatened to
expose more than 100% of Mobil's tax base to state taxation because
of the asserted power of New York, the state of Mobil's commercial
domicile, to tax all of Mobil's dividends on an unapportioned basis.
Since New York did not in fact tax the dividends at issue, Mobil was
subjected only to a risk of multiple taxation, and the Court felt that it
was appropriate to consider initially whether proof of actual - not
merely potential - multiple taxation is a prerequisite to establishing
a violation of the commerce clause."t 0
The Court removed some of the uncertainty that has shrouded
106. See, e.g., 445 U.S. at 442-46.
107. See note 41 supra.
108. Brief for Appellant at 14-37, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425
(1980).
109. See 445 U.S. at 442-44.
110. Because the Court ultimately concluded that the commercial domicile lacked the
power to tax Mobil's dividends on an unapportioned basis, see text following note 129 infra,
the Court might have avoided reaching this issue by assuming arguendo that the risk test ap-
plied.
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this issue' by rejecting the contention that actual multiple taxation
must always be demonstrated to make out a case under the com-
merce clause. The Court agreed with Mobil "that the constitutional-
ity of a Vermont tax should not depend on the vagaries of New York
tax policy." 112 The Court thus put its imprimatur upon the "risk"
theory of the multiple taxation doctrine.
We should not be too quick to conclude, however, that Mobil
represents a sweeping endorsement of the risk theory. Just two years
earlier in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,1 13 the Court took a
different approach in rejecting a commerce clause challenge to a
state apportionment formula. Moorman, a manufacturer and seller
of animal feeds, manufactured in Illinois all of its products sold to
Iowa customers. It sought to demonstrate that Iowa's single-factor
sales formula for apportioning net income, in conjunction with Illi-
nois's standard three-factor formula, subjected income derived from
its Iowa sales to duplicative taxation in violation of the commerce
clause. 14 The Court rejected this claim on two grounds. First,
Moorman had failed to establish the "essential factual predicate"
1 5
for a claim of duplicative taxation: the company had not proven that
"Illinois and Iowa together imposed a tax on more than 100% of the
relevant net income." ' 1 6 Second, despite this flaw in the taxpayer's
case, the Court went on to address the constitutional issues raised by
the two conflicting formulas on the assumption that they produced
"some overlap"' 17 in the taxation of Moorman's income. The Court
then repudiated Moorman's contention that the commerce clause
prohibits any overlap in the computation of taxable income by the
states, taking the position that the risk of duplicative taxation does
not automatically offend the commerce clause. 118
111. See, e.g., W. Hellerstein, supra note 7, at 799-803.
112. 445 U.S. at 444.
113. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
114. Iowa's single-factor formula consisted of the ratio of Moorman's gross sales in the
state to the company's entire gross sales, wherever located. This ratio was applied to Moor-
man's net income to determine the amount of its income taxable by Iowa. 437 U.S. at 270. By
contrast, Illinois used three factors to determine the portion of Moorman's income it could tax:
Moorman's real and tangible personal property, payrolls and sales. For each factor Illinois
compared the amount of the factor in Illinois to the amount occurring everywhere. The three
ratios were then averaged and the resulting fraction applied to Moorman's net income. Be-
cause the two states employed different factors, there was a risk of duplication in the taxable
income calculated by each state. See 437 U.S. at 277. For an illustration of duplicative taxa-
tion resulting from inconsistent apportionment formulas, see note 123 infra.
115. 437 U.S. at 276.
116. 437 U.S. at 276.
117. 437 U.S. at 277.
118. If the Constitution were read to mandate such precision in interstate taxation, the
consequences would extend far beyond this particular case. For some risk of duplicative
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Given the different approaches to the multiple taxation doctrine
in Mobil and Moorman, the question arises whether they are consis-
tent. It is possible, of course, that Mobil simply overrules sub silentlo
Moorman's insistence on proof of actual duplicative taxation for es-
tablishing a commerce clause claim predicated on the multiple taxa-
tion doctrine. Indeed, the obvious distinction between the cases, that
Mobil but not Moorman involved foreign commerce, provides no
basis for reconciling them because the Court in Mobil accepted the
risk theory of multiple taxation without taking into account the al-
leged presence of foreign commerce."19 Nevertheless, there is a basis
for reconciling the opinions. The risk deemed sufficient by the Court
in Mobil to raise a constitutional issue was created by two theoreti-
cally inconsistent methods of attributing income to a state for tax
purposes: specific allocation of all Mobil's foreign source dividends
to a single situs - Mobil's commercial domicile, New York - ver-
sus apportionment of the dividends by formula among Vermont and
other states. 120 If the two methods were employed simultaneously by
different states, they would necessarily cause multiple taxation. In
Moorman, by contrast, the dispute was not over the method of at-
tributing income to a state; the parties were in agreement that appor-
tionment by formula was the appropriate method of determining the
share of Moorman's income that Iowa might constitutionally tax.
Rather, the dispute was over the choice of the particular formula
employed by the State. The Court may be prepared to police the
choice of division-of-income rules insofar as is necessary to prevent
the states from adopting different methods of division that will, if
applied, necessarily result in duplicative taxation. It may not, how-
ever, be willing to engage in the "extensive judicial lawmaking" ' 2 1 of
prescribing the precise formula that a state must adopt in dividing
taxation exists whenever the States in which a corporation does business do not follow
identical rules for the division of income. The asserted constitutional flaw in th[e]
formula is that it is different from that presently employed by a majority of States and that
difference creates a risk of duplicative taxation. But a host of other division-of-income
problems create precisely the same risk and would similarly rise to constitutional propor-
tions.
Thus, it would be necessary for this Court to prescribe a uniform [apportionment]
formula [for all the states]. . . .The Constitution, however, is neutral with respect to the
content of any uniform rule.
437 U.S. at 278-79.
119. See 445 U.S. at 443-44. The Court addressed foreign commerce only in a separate
portion of the opinion, and treated it merely as an additional consideration. See 445 U.S. at
446-49.
120. See text at notes 16-27 supra for a more extensive discussion of allocation and appor-
tionment.
121. Moorman, 437 U.S. at 278.
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income by the apportionment method. 22
This explanation may be questioned on two grounds. First, it
places substantial and, perhaps, unwarranted weight on the distinc-
tion between duplicative taxation caused by the adoption of two dif-
ferent methods of attributing income and duplicative taxation
caused by the adoption of two variations on a single method. The
multiple taxation resulting from the application of two inconsistent
variations of a particular method is no less inevitable and burden-
some than the multiple taxation resulting from the application of
methods that are themselves inconsistent.' 23 It would be odd for a
Court committed to deciding state tax cases on the basis of "the prac-
tical effect of the exaction"' 24 to enshrine as a principle of constitu-
tional analysis a distinction based on whether duplicative taxation
resulted from inconsistency between, rather than within, methods of
income attribution. Second, the Court in Moorman directed its com-
ments to multiple taxation problems created by inconsistent division-
of-income rules without regard to whether the problems were caused
by inter- or intra-methodological inconsistencies. Although the case
was limited to a choice between apportionment formulas, the Court
explicitly adverted to risks of multiple taxation that were created by
choices between allocation to the commercial domicile, on the one
hand, and apportionment by formula, on the other.
25
The Court may ultimately resolve the apparent conflict between
Mobil and Moorman over whether an actual burden must be shown
to establish a case of multiple taxation. 26 For the moment, Mobil
and Moorman lay the groundwork for future controversies regarding
this issue. The Court's approach in Mobil is more principled than its
122. Some support for this thesis may be found in the Court's long-standing and frequently
repeated view that "rough approximation rather than precision" is the constitutional standard
for judging the validity of apportionment formulas, see, e.g., International Harvester Co. v.
Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422 (1947) (quoting Illinois Cent. Ry. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157. 161
(1940)), and its recognition that "apportionment necessarily entails some inaccuracy and du-
plication." Mobil, 445 U.S. at 446 (citing the rationale in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979)).
123. For example, if all ofan enterprise's property is located in State , which has a single-
factor property formula for apportioning income, and all of the enterprise's sales are made in
State B, which has a single-factor sales formula for apportioning income, the resulting duplica-
tive taxation is as inexorable and onerous as any that may be produced by a conflict between
two different methods of income attribution.
124. Washington Revenue Dept. v. Stevedoring Assn., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978).
125. 437 U.S. at 278-79 & n.15.
126. The Court again faced this issue in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 100
S. Ct. 2109 (1980), argued even before the Court decided Mobil. But the commerce clause
claims in the two cases were so similar, and the Court in Exxon followed its reasoning in
Mobil so exactly, that Exxon sheds little additional light on the issue. See text at notes 229-33
infra .
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approach in Moorman and meets the objection that limitations on
state taxing power should not be on a "first-come-first-tax basis."1
27
Nevertheless, consideration of the appropriate judicial role in re-
viewing state apportionment formulas, as well as the suspicion that
undertaxation rather than overtaxation of multistate corporate in-
come is the norm, 2 8 warns against an unreserved embrace of the risk
criterion. Until the issue is resolved, only a taxpayer that demon-
strates that more than 100% of its income has in fact been subjected
to state taxation can depend on the Court to grant relief. 29
2. Taxation of Dividend Income. Allocation or Apportionment?
Having determined that alleging a risk of multiple taxation pro-
vided Mobil with a basis for challenging the Vermont levy under the
commerce clause, the Court turned to the question whether the risk
in fact existed. The answer depended on whether New York, the
state of Mobil's commercial domicile, possessed the power to tax all
of Mobil's dividends. If, as Mobil argued, New York possessed such
power, then Vermont's power to tax even an apportioned share of
those dividends created a risk of multiple taxation. Because these
two methods of income attribution - specific allocation to a single
state and apportionment among the states - together produced a
risk of multiple taxation, the Court was forced to choose between
them.
Faced with this choice, the Court had little hesitation in conclud-
ing that apportionment was the appropriate method of determining
which states are entitled to tax a corporation's dividend income. It
traced the allocation of dividends to a single situs to cases involving
taxation of intangible property, where allocation served to avoid
multiple taxation of ownership.1 30 It observed that the doctrinal ba-
sis for such an allocation - mobilia sequunterpersonam'31 - had
127. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436,458 (1964) (Goldberg, J., dissent-
ing).
128. We should soon be in a better position to determine whether this suspicion is war-
ranted. See text at note 277 infra.
129. This conclusion finds support in the Court's emphasis in Moorman that the taxpayer's
claim was "speculative," 437 U.S. at 276, 280, as well as the Court's observations in Mobil that
the presence or absence of an actual burden does alter the nature of a taxpayer's claim, 445
U.S. at 444, and that the Court possesses the power to correct gross overreaching resulting
from apportionment. 445 U.S. at 447. Even this conclusion may be challenged, however.
Moorman can be read together with the Court's unwillingness to constitutionalize state divi-
sion-of-income rules or to prescribe uniform national standards for attributing income to the
states to suggest that even an actual burden will not raise a commerce clause claim when the
burden results from inconsistency in such rules. See 437 U.S. at 278-80.
130. 445 U.S. at 445.
13 . Movables follow the person.
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been discredited as "stat[ing] a rule without disclosing the reasons
for it." 132 It noted further that the rule of allocation to a single situs
had not only been eroded in the context of property and franchise
taxes, 33 but that it had no necessary application to income from in-
tangibles.134 While recognizing New York's power to impose some
tax on Mobil's dividend income, the Court concluded:
There is no reason in theory why that power should be exclusive when
the dividends reflect income from a unitary business, part of which is
conducted in other States. In that situation, the income bears relation
to benefits and privileges conferred by several states. These are the
circumstances in which apportionment is ordinarily the accepted
method. Since Vermont seeks to tax income, not ownership, we hold
that its interest in taxing a proportionate share of appellant's dividend
income is not overridden by any interest of the state of commercial
domicile.135
Three points place this conclusion in proper perspective. First,
the commerce clause portion of the Mobil opinion did not answer
the questions left open by the Court's due process holding. In
neither part of the decision did the Court hold that the apportion-
ment of Mobil's dividend income by a formula reflecting Mobil's
own operations, but not those of its subsidiaries and affiliates, was
necessarily defensible. Instead, it held only that Vermont was eiti-
tled to tax an apportioned share of Mobil's dividends. The com-
merce clause, like the due process clause, 36 requires that a state
income tax be fairly apportioned. 37 But in the commerce clause
portion of the opinion, as in the due process portion, the fairness of
Vermont's method was not addressed by the Court because Mobil, in
the Court's view, had not challenged it.138 Second, the Court's ap-
proval of apportionment rather than allocation in this case does not
mean that allocation is inappropriate in all contexts. Here the dis-
puted dividends arose out of activities that were deemed to be part of
a unitary business, 39 and the Court limited its holding to such divi-
dends. Dividends that do not reflect activities of a taxpayer's unitary
132. 445 U.S. at 445 (quoting First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 241
(1937)).
133. 445 U.S. at 445 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939); Curry v.
McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U.S. 185
(1897)).
134. 445 U.S. at 445 (citing Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936)).
135. 445 U.S. at 445-46.
136. See text at note 48 supra.
137. See 445 U.S. at 443 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977)).
138. 445 U.S. at 434, 449. See text at notes 66, 82-104 supra.
139. 445 U.S. at 442. See text at notes 47-75 supra.
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business in a taxing state will presumably be excluded from the
state's apportionable tax base and either apportioned to states where
the dividends reflect another unitary business of the taxpayer, or,
perhaps, allocated to the taxpayer's commercial domicile if the divi-
dends are from true portfolio investments. 4° Finally, the Court's
preference for apportionment among the states over allocation to a
single state is by no means limited to state income taxes. Indeed, the
Court's modem decisions involving property taxes reflect a similar
preference. 141
3. Taxation of Dividend Income from Foreign Source.
Allocation or Apportionment?
The Court's preference for apportionment over allocation of divi-
dend income did not dispose of Mobil's commerce clause claim.
Mobil argued that however matters might stand if the controversy
concerned dividends from domestic sources, dividends from foreign
sources were entitled to additional constitutional protection that
could be provided only by allocating them to the state of commercial
domicile. 142 Mobil's argument relied heavily on Japan Line, Ltd v.
County of Los Angeles, 143 which struck down a local property tax on
Japanese cargo containers whose full value had already been taxed
in Japan. The Court held that a state lacks power under the com-
merce clause to impose even a fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory
property tax upon foreign-owned and foreign-based instrumentali-
ties of foreign commerce used exclusively in furtherance of such
commerce. Japan Line identified two factors (beyond those the
Court ordinarily considers in adjudicating the validity of state taxes
on interstate commerce) that must be considered when a state seeks
140. See UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PuRPosEs ACT (U.L.A.) §§ 1(a), 1(e), 4,
7. Intangibles have sometimes been found to acquire a taxable "business situs," distinct from
the taxpayer's commercial domicile, when they have become an integral part of the taxpayer's
business carried on in a state. See, e.g., First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234,
237 (1937); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 208-10 (1936); New Orleans v. Stempel,
175 U.S. 309, 322-23 (1899). The Court's rejection of these property tax concepts as analogies
for taxation of income from intangibles, 445 U.S. at 445, coupled with its preference for appor-
tionment rather than allocation of income integrally related to some part of the taxpayer's
business, 445 U.S. at 445-48, suggests that the Court would not view the "business situs" of
intangibles as an alternative to the commercial domicile for allocating dividend income unre-
lated to the taxpayer's business in the taxing states. It would instead view such income as
apportionable by those states, including the "business situs," in which the taxpayer conducted
a unitary business to which such dividends related.
141. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 441-44 (1979).
142. Brief for Appellant at 14-16, 22-37, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445
U.S. 425 (1980).
143. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
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to tax instrumentalities of foreign commerce:44 "the enhanced risk
of multiple taxation," 145 . and the possibility that "a state tax on the
instrumentalities of foreign commerce may impair federal uniform-
ity in an area where federal uniformity is essential." 146 Mobil urged
that these considerations justified a rule allocating dividends from
foreign sources to a company's commercial domicile.
The Court found the analogy to Japan Line "forced"' 147 and "un-
persuasive." 148 First, Japan Line involved property taxation, and the
Court had already expressed reservations about applying reasoning
from property tax cases to division-of-income problems. 49 Second,
Japan Line involved multiple taxation at the international level,
whereas Mobil, which had conceded the power of the state of its
commercial domicile to tax 100% of its foreign source dividends, was
ultimately concerned solely with multiple taxation among the
states. 150 Even though such multiple taxation might burden foreign
commerce, the ability to remove the burden lay within the Court's
power, since it enjoyed final authority over the reach of state taxing
measures. In Japan Line, by contrast, where the problem involved
duplicative taxation by a state and a foreign sovereign, the Court
lacked the "ability to enforce full apportionment by all potential tax-
ing bodies,"' 5' and it therefore felt compelled to deny Los Angeles
- as it would, presumably, any other American political subdivision
- the power to tax the Japanese containers at all.' 52 Finally, the
Court defended its refusal to adopt a rule of allocation for foreign
source dividends by warning of its implications.' 53 Because Mobil's
argument was not logically confined to dividend income, it could
well be applied to other types of foreign source income. Such an
extension would cause significant difficulties for state tax authorities
in trying to determine the foreign source of particular items of in-
144. When foreign commerce is not involved, a tax on interstate commerce will withstand
constitutional scrutiny under the commerce clause if it "is applied to an activity with a sub-
stantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against inter-
state commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." E.g., Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
145. 441 U.S. at 446-48.
146. 441 U.S. at 448-51.
147. 445 U.S. at 448.
148. 445 U.S. at 446.
149. 445 U.S. at 448. See text at notes 130-34 supra.
150. 445 U.S. at 447-48.
151. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. at 447.
152. 441 U.S. at 447-48.
153. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at 447.
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come, 154 a task that is obviated when an apportionment scheme is
employed. This reasoning suggests that in the appropriate case the
Court would likewise conclude that other kinds of foreign source in-
come from intangibles - such as foreign source interest, royalty,
and patent income - may be apportioned rather than allocated. 155
C. Federal Tax Policy and State Taxation of
Foreign Source Dividends
The second factor identified in Japan Line as bearing on the ap-
plication of the commerce clause to state taxation of foreign com-
merce - the danger that such taxation will "preven[t] the Federal
Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating com-
mercial relations with foreign governments' ",156 - laid the ground-
work for Mobil's final claim, a claim based on federal preemption.
Mobil argued that established federal policies of avoiding double
taxation of foreign source income and encouraging the payment of
foreign dividends required that the state of a corporation's commer-
cial domicile alone be empowered to tax foreign source dividends. 157
The Court gave short shrift to this argument:
The federal statutes and treaties that Mobil cites ... concern
problems of multiple taxation at the international level and simply are
not germane to the issue of multiple state taxation that appellant has
framed. Concurrent federal and state taxation of income, of course, is
a well-established norm. Absent some explicit directive from Con-
gress, we cannot infer that treatment of foreign income at the federal
level mandates identical treatment by the States.'5 8
The Court's disposition of this issue would not, under most cir-
cumstances, merit attention. The Court has seldom found in federal
tax or related policy any basis for limiting state taxation of private
enterprise, 159 and there was nothing about Mobil's case that seemed
likely to produce an exception to the general rule. What makes the
Court's remarks significant, however, is that they may have a bearing
on proposed congressional restrictions on state taxation of foreign
154. 445 U.S. at 447.
155. The Court offered one additional reason for distinguishing Japan Line. It observed
that Japan Line involved actual multiple taxation that could be relieved only by allocation to
the commercial domicile, Japan, whereas no duplicative taxation was actually involved in Mo-
bil. 445 U.S. at 448. The Court's reliance on this distinction is inconsistent with its view,
expressed earlier in the opinion, that the risk rather than the fact of multiple taxation was the
controlling constitutional criterion. See text at note 112 supra.
156. 441 U.S. at 451 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
157. Brief for Appellant at 38-48, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425
(1980).
158. 445 U.S. at 448.
159. A rare exception is McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940).
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source income. The proposed legislation in large part imposes upon
the states the federal model for taxing foreign source income. If the
Court's observation that "problems of multiple taxation at the inter-
national level. . . simply are not germane to the issue of multiple
state taxation"'160 is relevant not only to constitutional adjudication
but also to sound tax policy, then the congressional effort may be
fundamentally misdirected.
Part III of this Article will explore this problem as well as others
raised by the Congress's proposed limitations of state taxation of for-
eign source income - a debate that will now proceed in the shadow
of Mobil. But an informed discussion of the proposed legislation
first requires an understanding of the Exxon decision.
II. EXXON CORP. V. WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE:
STATE TAXATION OF A UNITARY BUSINESS
The Court's decision in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of
Revenue' 6 1 followed on the heels of Mobil.162 Although the issues in
Exxon and Mobil were distinguishable, it would have been hard to
write an opinion delineating the constitutional constraints on state
taxation of one integrated oil company without affecting a subse-
quent opinion addressed to such constraints on state taxation of an-
other oil company. Indeed, while Exxon possesses independent
significance, the principles set forth in Mobil substantially influenced
the analysis in Exxon, notwithstanding Exxon's last-minute effort to
bring to the Court's attention the "pronounced and readily discerni-
ble differences"' 63 between the two cases.
Like Vermont, Wisconsin imposes an income tax upon every cor-
poration doing business in the state.' 64 Like Mobil, Exxon is one of
the world's largest integrated oil companies.' 65 Like Mobil, Exxon
conducted its integrated operations from wellhead to gas pump on a
global basis, yet its activities in Wisconsin, like Mobil's in Vermont,
were limited to the marketing of petroleum products. Unlike the
160. 445 U.S. at 448.
161. 100 S. Ct. 2109 (1980).
162. Mobil was decided on March 19, 1980, the day after oral argument in Exxon. Exxon
was decided on June 10, 1980.
163. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 7, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue,
100 S. Ct. 2109 (1980).
164. Wis. STAT. §§ 71.01(1), (2) (1977).
165. In fact, based on sales, it is the largest, and it was also the nation's largest industrial
corporation in 1979. See FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Aug. 11, 1980, at 190; id., May 5, 1980, at 276.
Exxon is the legal successor to Humble Oil and Refining Co., the original taxpayer during the
years in question, 1965-1968. 100 S. Ct. at 2113-14 n.l. This Article will follow the Court's
opinion in referring to the taxpayer by its present name. 100 S. Ct. at 2114 n.l.
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controversy between Mobil and Vermont, however, the controversy
between Exxon and Wisconsin did not concern dividend income.
Indeed, during the years in question Wisconsin did not seek to in-
clude dividend income received by a nondomiciliary corporation
like Exxon within the corporation's apportionable tax base. 166
Rather, the dispute was over operating income. Specifically, Exxon
challenged the constitutionality of Wisconsin's application of its
three-factor apportionment formula 67 to all of the company's oper-
ating income even though the company carried on only marketing
activities in Wisconsin and had segregated, by separate functional
accounting, the income produced by its marketing activities from its
out-of-state, nonmarketing activities. As in Mobil, the Court re-
jected both Exxon's due process and commerce clause arguments.
A. Due Process Limitations on State Taxation
of a Unitary Business
1. Separate Accounting versus Formulary Apportionment
The main thrust of Exxon's due process argument was that it had
done what Mobil had failed to do, namely, provide the proof that
was essential to its case. Exxon claimed it had demonstrated "by
clear and cogent evidence" 6 8 that Wisconsin's apportionment of Ex-
xon's income to the state had produced a "grossly distorted result"
69
"out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted. . .i
that state."' 170 The consequence, it asserted, was "a Due Process vio-
lation as both the elements of a minimal connection (nexus) and a
166. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 71.07(1), (2) (West 1969 & Supp. 1980); Armour & Co. v.
Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, 252 Wis. 468, 32 N.W.2d 324 (1948). Under present practice,
Wisconsin seeks to include dividends received by a nondomiciliary corporation in its appor-
tionable tax base when such dividends derive from property whose acquisition, management,
or disposition constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's business. Wisconsin Department of
Revenue Rule 2.39(6), reported in STATE AND LOCAL TAXES (Wis.) (P-H) 110,653.101 (1979);
see also Instructions for Wisconsin Corporate Franchise and Income Tax Return, Form 4B,
Schedule M-l, reproduced in id. T 11,805, at p. 11,823.
167. During the years in question, Wisconsin's formula for apportioning corporate income
was comprised of three equally weighted factors of property, manufacturing costs (including
payroll) and sales. Wis. STAT. § 71.07(2) (1977), quoted, inpart, at 100 S. Ct. at 2115 n.3. The
current version of Wisconsin's formula resembles the one in the earlier statute, the most signif-
icant change being that the sales factor is weighted 50% while the property and payroll factors
are each weighted 25%. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.07(2) (West Supp. 1980).
168. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682, 688 (1936).
169. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Commn., 390 U.S. 317, 329 (1968).
170. Brief for Appellant at 24, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 100 S. Ct.
2109 (1980) (quoting Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123,
135 (1931)). See generally Brief for Appellant at 17-44, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of
Revenue, 100 S. Ct. 2109 (1980).
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rational relationship were lacking."' 171 To make its evidentiary dem-
onstration - a feat which no income taxpayer had performed suc-
cessfully before the Supreme Court in fifty years 72 - Exxon had
developed an extensive record based largely on separate functional
accounting procedures that purportedly identified the income pro-
duced by discrete functional segments of its business.
Exxon first showed that its operations were organized along func-
tional lines. Separate operating departments corresponded to func-
tional segments of Exxon's business. The three principal functional
departments were Exploration and Production, Refining, and Mar-
keting. 173 Each department was organized as a separate and in-
dependent operating unit: each had its own management; each was
independently responsible for its own performance; and each depart-
ment's profit was determined separately. The functional depart-
ments competed with one another for available investment funds
and with other firms in the industry for available supplies. There
was no requirement, for example, that crude oil produced by Explo-
ration and Production be transferred to Refining for processing and
then to Marketing for ultimate sale as Exxon products. While there
were transfers between these departments, the transfers were in prin-
ciple based on competitive market prices: transfers of crude oil from
Exploration and Production to Refining were treated as sales at
posted industry prices; transfers of processed products from Refining
to Marketing were treated as sales at wholesale market prices. If
there was no readily available market price for a product, represen-
tatives of the two functional departments involved would negotiate
to establish the internal transfer price. 174
As a result of this organizational arrangement, Exxon was able to
demonstrate according to its internal accounting procedures the pre-
cise amount of income that each of its functional departments
earned. 175 Relying on these data, Exxon showed that the income in-
171. Brief for Appellant at 14, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 100 S. Ct.
2109 (1980).
172. See Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 134-35
(1931). Unsuccessful attempts were made in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978);
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North Carolina ex rel.
Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682 (1936); and Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 642 (1934), affg.
per curiam, 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 397 (1933). During this period the Court did, however,
invalidate the District of Columbia's single-factor sales formula for apportioning corporate
income, but on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. General Motors Corp. v. District
of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
173. The others were Marine, Coal and Shale Oil, Minerals, and Land Management. 100
S. Ct. at 2114.
174. 100 S. Ct. at 2114.
175. See, e.g., Schedule A to Exhibit 28, reproduced in Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v.
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cluded in its apportionable tax base by Wisconsin exceeded the in-
come produced by its Marketing Department.'7 6 Inasmuch as
Exxon's operations in Wisconsin were limited to marketing, Exxon
contended that Wisconsin's attempt to include income attributable to
functions other than marketing in its apportionable tax base consti-
tuted extraterritorial taxation prohibited by the due process
clause.177 Further, Exxon claimed that its separate accounting data
were sufficient to defeat Wisconsin's apportioned tax on all of its
income even assuming that Exxon's overall business was unitary.
Exxon's claim was thus grounded on the general propositions
that separate accounting can defeat the formulary apportionment of
income of a unitary business, and that it can do so by showing either
that part of the income is not attributable to business done in the
state or that the resulting tax is out of all proportion to business con-
ducted in the state. 7 8 Exxon derived support for these propositions
from the Court's decision in Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina
ex rel. Maxwell.179 Hans Rees invalidated the application of North
Carolina's single-factor apportionment formula to the income of a
unitary business on the basis of the taxpayer's separate accounting
evidence that the income attributed to the state by the formula was
grossly in excess of that derived from the state. Exxon also took com-
fort in language in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair. °80 Al-
though the Court in that case dismissed a due process attack on
Iowa's single-factor sales formula for apportioning income, it ob-
Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 727 n.1, 281 N.W.2d 94, 108 n.l (1979), afd., 100 S. Ct. 2109
(1980).
176. Brief for Appellant at 25-27, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 100 S. Ct.
2109 (1980).
177. Id. at 17-44. Exxon's original position, reflected in its Wisconsin income tax returns
for the years in question, was that its separate geographic accounting procedures actually
showed losses for its Wisconsin marketing activities. See 100 S. Ct. at 2115; Wisconsin Dept.
of Revenue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700,727 n.l, 281 N.W.2d 94, 108 n.1 (1979), affd., 100
S. Ct. 2109 (1980). During the course of the protracted litigation, Exxon relied principally on
separatefunctional accounting to support its claim that Wisconsin was taxing it unconstitution-
ally. The effect of this was to concede that Wisconsin could tax an apportioned share of Ex-
xon's marketing income, but not its income from any other operating functions. See 100 S. Ct.
at 2118. Although this meant that Exxon would have some Wisconsin taxable income in each
of the years in question, the amounts were much less than Exxon's Wisconsin taxable income
resulting from the state's approach of including substantially all of Exxon's operating income
in its apportionable tax base. 90 Wis. 2d at 727 n.1, 281 N.W.2d at 108 n.l. The Court stated
that the principles controlling the weight to be accorded the taxpayer's separate accounting
demonstrations were the same whether separate geographic or functional accounting was at
issue. 100 S. Ct. at 2120 n.7.
178. Brief for Appellant at 27, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 100 S. Ct.
2109 (1980).
179. 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
180. 437 U.S. 267 (1978). Moorman is discussed in text at notes 113-29 supra.
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served that the attack might have been upheld had the taxpayer
demonstrated, through "any separate accounting analysis showing
what portion of appellant's profits was attributable to sales, to manu-
facturing, or to any other phase of the company's operations,"1 8'
that income attributed to Iowa was in fact generated by non-Iowa
operations. To be sure, the Court had earlier declared in Butler
Brothers v. McColgan182 that a taxpayer's separate accounting evi-
dence, though valid by its own terms and for its own purposes,
would not "impeach the validity or propriety"' 83 of the application
of California's three-factor apportionment formula to the income of
a unitary business. Nevertheless, the Court's subsequent comment in
Moorman had left unclear what weight, if any, the Court would ac-
cord to separate accounting evidence in adjudicating the validity of
an income apportionment formula applied to a unitary enterprise.
Wisconsin did not challenge the accuracy of Exxon's separate ac-
counting evidence. Instead, it took issue with Exxon's contention
that the company's separate accounting could preclude apportion-
ment of the income from Exxon's unitary business. Wisconsin as-
serted that it was entitled to include income from Exxon's
exploration, production, and refining functions in the company's ap-
portionable tax base along with income from its marketing function,
whatever the results of Exxon's separate functional accounting.184
The only question, according to the State, was whether the income
Wisconsin sought to include in Exxon's apportionable tax base was
generated by a unitary business conducted in part in the State. If it
was, the argument continued, no separate accounting demonstration,
however accurate by its own terms, could impeach the results of Wis-
consin's formulary apportionment of Exxon's unitary income. Fi-
nally, the State reasoned, since the record amply supported the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's determination that Exxon's Wisconsin
operations constituted an integral part of its overall unitary petro-
leum business, 85 the State's apportioned tax was constitutionally in-
vulnerable.
The Supreme Court largely agreed. Rather than attempting to
walk an analytical tightrope between the language and holdings of
181. 437 U.S. at 272.
182. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
183. 315 U.S. at 508.
184. See Brief for Appellee at 10-33, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 100 S.
Ct. 2109 (1980).
185. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 281 N.W.2d 94 (1979),
afqd, 100 S. Ct. 2109'(1980).
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its earlier separate accounting decisions, the Court chose to come
down firmly on the side of apportionment - at least in its three-
factor configuration - as a method of dividing the income of a uni-
tary business income among states that is virtually unimpeachable
by separate accounting. Relying heavily on its opinion in Butler
Brothers, the Court held that a state may constitutionally determine
a taxpayer's tax base by applying a three-factor apportionment
formula to the entire income of a unitary business conducted in part
in the state, even if the taxpayer's separate accounting evidence pro-
duces results inconsistent with such apportionment.18 6
The Court rejected Exxon's argument that "[a] finding of unitary
[business] at the very most provides merely a condition precedent to
the right to apply an apportionment formula to the income of the so-
called unitary business."'187 Invoking Mobil, the Court ruled that a
state has the constitutionally required nexus to all the activities of a
unitary business conducted in part in the state, and the state "may
apply an apportionment formula to the taxpayer's total income."' 188
It held that neither the required nexus nor the right of the state to
apply an apportionment formula to a unitary business can be im-
peached by separate accounting. Separate accounting evidence can
exclude income from an apportionable tax base of a unitary business
only by proving that "the income [was] derive[d] from 'unrelated
business activity' which constitutes a 'discrete business enter-
prise,' "1189 that is, in this case, by proving that the sale of petroleum
products in Wisconsin and Exxon's nonmarketing activities were not
a unitary business in the first place. The Court had little difficulty
concluding that Exxon's Wisconsin activities were part of a unitary
business. 190
The Court also considered Exxon's appeal to the second due
process restriction on state tax power: the requirement of a rational
relationship between the income attributed to a state by its appor-
tionment formula and the intrastate value of the business. 191 The
Court entertained Exxon's separate accounting evidence, thus imply-
186. I00 S. Ct. at 2119. Exxon had shown that the income Wisconsin sought to include in
its apportionable tax base exceeded the income generated by its marketing activities, which
were the only activities Exxon conducted in Wisconsin. See text at notes 176-77 supra.
187. Brief for Appellant at 27, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 100 S. Ct.
2109 (1980).
188. 100 S. Ct. at 2118, 2120.
189. 100 S. Ct. at 2120, quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. at
439, 442.
190. See 100 S. Ct. at 2120-21; text at notes 205-28 infra.
191. See 100 S. Ct. at 2122; Brief for Appellant at 24-30, 35, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
Dept. of Revenue, 100 S. Ct. 2109 (1980).
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ing that application of an apportionment formula might be im-
peached by a separate accounting demonstration that "the State has
used its formula to attribute income 'out of all appropriate propor-
tion to the business transacted. . . in that State.' 192 Although the
Court found inconsistent results between the formula and separate
accounting, it held that there was no violation of the rational relation
requirement. 193
As for its remarks in Moorman that separate accounting evi-
dence might provide the basis for a successful due process attack on
formulary apportionment of income from a unitary business, the
Court denigrated them as "dicta". 94 It first observed that
separate accounting, while it purports to isolate portions of income re-
ceived in various States, may fail to account for contributions to in-
come resulting from functional integration, centralization of
management, and economies of scale. . . . Although separate ...
accounting may be useful for internal auditing, for purposes of state
taxation it is not constitutionally required.' 95
It then declared:
In Moorman we simply noted that the taxpayer had made no showing
that its Illinois operations were responsible for profits from sales in
Iowa. This hardly leads to the conclusion, urged by Exxon here, that a
taxpayer's separate functional accounting, if it purports to separate out
income from various aspects of the business, must be accepted as a
matter of constitutional law for state tax purposes. Such evidence may
be helpful, but Moorman in no sense renders such accounting conclu-
sive. ' 96
After considering the Court's remarks in Exxon, only the most
sanguine taxpayer would harbor the hope that the Supreme Court
may still be moved by separate accounting evidence to invalidate the
application of a three-factor apportionment formula to the income of
a unitary business. The deference that the Court has displayed to-
wards state apportionment formulas in general, 97 and towards the
three-factor formula in particular, 198 is likely to overcome any sepa-
rate accounting demonstration that a taxpayer is capable of making,
192. 100 S. Ct. at 2122, quoting Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283
U.S. 123, 125 (1931).
193. 100 S. Ct. at 2122. Exxon's due process challenge was organized into two prongs,
each relating to different sources of Exxon's income. Both prongs relied on separate account-
ing evidence and many of the same precedents. See Brief for Appellant at 17-44, Exxon Corp.
v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 100 S. Ct. 2109 (1980).
194. 100 S. Ct. at 2120.
195. 100 S. Ct. at 2119-20, quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425, 438 (1980).
196. 100 S. Ct. at 2120 (footnote omitted).
197. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
198. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 509 (1942). Cf. General Motors Corp. v.
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whether on a functional or a geographic basis. 199 "
With the Court's remarks in Moorman deprived of persuasive
force, Hans Rees stands alone as an isolated monument to the ability
of one taxpayer to use separate accounting evidence to challenge
successfully a state's apportionment of unitary business income.
Moreover, even Hans Rees may be in harmony with the Court's
present views. Hans Rees can, of course, be distinguished from Ex-
xon as a case in which the high percentage of the taxpayer's income
apportioned to the taxing state and the glaring disparity between the
result derived from formulary apportionment and separate account-
ing necessarily raised questions about the fairness and rationality of
the state's approach.2°° But there is a more fundamental distinction
between the two cases. Hans Rees involved a single-factor property
formula for apportioning income. Despite the Court's frequent re-
jection of constitutional attacks on the states' use of single-factor for-
mulas,20' the Court and individual Justices have voiced concern over
the fairness of such formulas.20 2 At the same time, the Court has
expressed broad approval of the three-factor formula "as a rough,
practical approximation of the distribution of either a corporation's
District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 561 (1965) (invalidating single-factor sales formula on
statutory grounds).
199. The Court in Exxon declined to draw any distinction in the weight to be accorded
separate functional accounting evidence and separate geographic accounting evidence for con-
stitutional purposes. 100 S. Ct. at 2120 n.7. See also 100 S. Ct. at 2122; note 177 supra.
200. In Hans Rees, the income apportioned by formula to North Carolina for the years in
question was approximately 83%, 85%, 66%, and 85% of the tax base; the income attributed to
the State by separate accounting was less than 22% of the tax base. In Exxon, the income
apportioned by formula to Wisconsin for the years in question was approximately.19%, .23%,
.23%, and .24% of the tax base; the income attributed to the state by separate accounting was
approximately. 13%, .06%, .07%, and. 13% of the tax base as determined by separate functional
accounting, and 0% for all four years as determined by separate geographic accounting, which
showed losses from Exxon's operations in Wisconsin for those years. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev-
enue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 727 n.l, 730 n.2, 281 N.W.2d 94, 108 n.1, 100 n.2 (1979).
The Supreme Court noted that the apportionment of a mere .22% of Exxon's apportionable
income tax base to the state for the years at issue, when considered in light of its substantial
sales activity in the state over that period, hardly made it a case "where the State has used its
formula to attribute income 'out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted...
in that State,'" 100 S. Ct. at 2122 (citing Hans Rees), or where application of the state's
formula "'led to a grossly distorted result.'" 100 S. Ct. at 2122 (citing Norfolk & W. Ry. v.
Missouri State Tax Commn., 390 U.S. 317, 326 (1968)).
201. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co. v. Max-
well, 291 U.S. 642 (1934), affg. per curiam, 204 N.C. 365, 168'S.E. 397 (1933); Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commn., 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
202. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (characterizing such formulas as "relics of the early days of state income taxation"), 437
U.S. at 283-97 (Powell, J., dissenting); General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S.
553, 561 (1965).
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sources of income or the social costs that it generates. '203 Hence, the
Court may still be receptive to a "separate accounting" constitu-
tional challenge to a single-factor formula like North Carolina's in
Hans Rees or Iowa's in Moorman, because of its belief that such
formulas are unlikely to reflect fairly the distribution of the income
of a multistate enterprise and thus may fail to satisfy the rational
relationship requireient of due process. On the other hand, while it
may be an overstatement to conclude that the application of a three-
factor apportionment formula to the income from a unitary business
meets the rational relationship requirement as a matter of law (de-
spite any sort of separate accounting demonstration), the results, if
not the reasoning, of future cases are likely to support such a conclu-
sion.2o4
2. The Scope of a Unitary Business
In addition to disposing of the separate accounting issue, the
Court considered the due process limits on the scope of a unitary
business for state income tax purposes. Since the existence of a uni-
tary business is an essential predicate to a state's apportionment of
income generated by that business, 20 5 the criteria for determining
whether a business is unitary are crucial. Over the years, the
Supreme Court has provided general guidance for this task without
committing itself to any particular approach. Thus, the Court has
considered as unitary those enterprises whose "ultimate gain is de-
rived from the entire business" 206 or whose income is earned by a
"series of transactions" in different states so that it is impossible to
allocate specifically the income earned within any one of them.207 It
has adverted to such factors as unity of ownership, management and
use in characterizing a business as unitary.208 And it has observed
that "the enterprise of a corporation which manufactures and sells its
manufactured product is ordinarily a unitary business. '20 9
In the absence of a more definitive instruction from the Supreme
203. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 561 (1965). See also
Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 509 (1942).
204. It is not clear what the Court's attitude would be were it confronted with an interme-
diate case as, for example, West Virginia's two-factor formula of property and payroll, W. VA.
CODE § I 1-24-7(d)(5) (1974), or Massachusetts' formula that gives double weight to the sales
factor. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 63, § 38(c) (Law. Co-op. 1978, Supp. 1980). See also note 164
supra.
205. See text at notes 186-89 supra.
206. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 133 (1931).
207. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120-21 (1920).
208. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 508 (1942).
209. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 133 (1931).
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Court, state courts have tried their own hands at delineating the
scope of a unitary business. Two of the leading formulations have
emanated from the California Supreme Court. It laid the ground-
work for the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Butler Broth-
ers by declaring in that case that
the unitary nature of appellant's business is definitely established by
the presence of the following circumstances: (1) Unity of ownership;
(2) Unity of operation as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising,
accounting and management divisions; and (3) unity [sic] of use in its
centralized executive force and general system of operation.210
The California court subsequently provided an alternative formula-
tion of the test for determining whether a business is unitary: "If the
operation of the portion of the business done within the state is de-
pendent upon or contributes to the operation of the business without
the state, the operations are unitary."21' Other state courts have ar-
ticulated the definition of a unitary business in terms of the interde-
pendence of the enterprise's operating units,212 the centralization of
corporate management or corporate staff personnel,213 the mutual
benefit that various parts of the enterprise derive from each other,214
the essentiality of one part of the enterprise to the other parts,215 and
the overall impact of the parts of the enterprise on the economic per-
formance of the whole. 216 Scholars have likewise entered the fray,
variously lauding and criticizing the tests adopted by the courts and
advancing suggestions of their own.217
The Court in Exxon did not canvass the possible formulations of
a unitary business or address their relative merits, despite the atten-
210. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 678, 111 P.2d 334, 341 (1941), aff, 315
U.S. 501 (1942). Accord, e.g., W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. v. Dickinson, 200 Tenn. 25, 34, 289
S.W.2d 533, 537 (1956).
211. Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 481, 183 P.2d 16, 21
(1947). Accord, e.g., Zale-Salem, Inc. v. State Tax Commn., 237 Or. 261, 265, 391 P.2d 601,
602 (1964).
212. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Advance-Wilson Indus., Inc., 456 Pa. 200, 203, 317 A.2d
642, 644-45 (1974).
213. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, - Mass. -, -, 393
N.E.2d 330, 336 n.10 (1979).
214. See, e.g., Crawford Mfg. Co. v. State Commn. of Revenue & Taxation, 180 Kan. 352,
359, 304 P.2d 504, 510 (1956).
215. See, e.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 269 Minn. 351, 367-68, 131
N.W.2d 632, 643 (1964).
216. See, e.g., Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 718, 281
N.W.2d 94, 104 (1979). It is self-evident that the various formulations or considerations cited
are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, courts frequently invoke two or more of them in address-
ing the unitary business issue. See, eg., 90 Wis. at 711, 281 N.W.2d at 100 (adopting "depen-
dent upon or contributory" test).
217. See authorities cited in note 51 supra.
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tion that was devoted to them in the briefs.2 18 Rather, the Court
adhered to its catholic approach by stressing a number of factors,
many of them familiar, in justifying its conclusion that Exxon's over-
all operations constituted a unitary business conducted in part in
Wisconsin. The Court recounted the record, which indicated that
Exxon was a corporate entity with centralized management - super-
vision of the Wisconsin marketing district was exercised from re-
gional and national headquarters, for example - and with
centralized corporate staff departments providing a wide range of
critical services for the entire corporation.21 9 Moreover, although
Exxon's Wisconsin activities were limited to marketing, the Court
pointed out that these activities were interdependent with the com-
pany's integrated operations at the national level, and that the whole
derived benefit from the sum of its parts, including marketing. 220 In
particular, Exxon employed centralized purchasing to enhance com-
pany-wide profits, 221 intradepartmental coordination to achieve op-
erating efficiencies, nationwide distribution and uniform brand
names, advertising, credit cards, and packaging to facilitate sales,
and a host of other important links between its three principal oper-
ating departments to provide "an assured supply of raw materi-
als[,] . . . stable outlet[s] for products[,] . . . and greater profits
stability," 222 for the entire corporate enterprise. In the Court's view
Exxon was a "highly integrated business which benefits from an um-
brella of centralized management and controlled interaction. '223
The Court was able to focus on all of these considerations and
remain uncommitted to any specific formulation of the unitary busi-
ness concept because Exxon presented an easy case. In light of the
facts of its operations, Exxon would have been found to be a unitary
business under almost any approach.224 No doubt the Court will
218. See Brief for Appellant at 17-30, Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 100 S.
Ct. 2109 (1980); Brief for Appellee at 10-25; Brief Amicus Curiae for the Multistate Tax Com-
mission and Participating States at 46-64.
219. 100 S. Ct. at 2114.
220. 100 S. Ct. at 2120-21.
221. Petroleum and petroleum products sold by Exxon in Wisconsin were manufactured
elsewhere and shipped into the state from central warehouse facilities in Chicago. Tires, bat-
teries and accessories were centrally purchased through Exxon's national headquarters and
shipped into Wisconsin for resale. The gasoline Exxon sold in Wisconsin was obtained from
another company under an exchange arrangement that was negotiated on Exxon's behalf by
two departments other than Marketing: Supply, a corporate staff department, and Refining.
See 100 S. Ct. at 2115.
222. 100 S. Ct. at 2121 (quoting the record testimony of an Exxon vice president).
223. 100 S. Ct. at 2120.
224. Except, perhaps, under a test stressing the essentiality of one part of the enterprise to
the other parts. See note 215 supra and accompanying text.
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someday be confronted with the harder cases involving
nonintegrated businesses that share some corporate staff services but
are otherwise independent enterprises.225 At that point, the Court
may have to refine its eclectic approach to the unitary business issue.
In the meantime, the Court's unwillingness to settle upon a single
definition of a unitary business is consistent with its view that the
states should be free within broad limits to tax interstate business by
any method that in design and effect attributes a reasonable share of
the business' income to the taxing state. By adverting to virtually all
of the considerations that have been embodied in the various formu-
lations of the unitary business concept, the Court left the door open
to approval of any particular formulation that satisfies its generous
view of state taxing authority. Indeed, in light of the wide variety of
overlapping and inconsistent22 6 formulations of the unitary business
concept, all of which are arguably embraced within the views ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court, the concept may not retain any force
as a meaningful restraint on the applicability of an apportionment
formula to an enterprise's income.2 27 While the concept may serve
to limit the reach of a state's apportionment formula in those juris-
dictions where it has been narrowly defined,22 8 the present posture of
the Supreme Court provides few curbs on the scope of the unitary
business concept under the due process clause.
B. Commerce Clause Limitations on State Taxation
of a Unitary Business
Like Mobil, Exxon invoked the commerce clause as well as the
due process clause to challenge the application of the state's taxing
scheme to its income, contending that the levy violated the com-
merce clause by subjecting the company to a multiple tax burden not
borne by local business. Moreover, despite the differences alluded to
earlier229 between the controversies in Mobil and Exxon, the com-
merce clause claims in the two cases were remarkably similar. Mobil
225. Cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, - Mass. -, 393 N.E.2d 330
(1979) (the Massachusetts business activities of W.R. Grace & Co. and the sale by W.R. Grace
& Co. of its controlling interest in Miller Brewing Co. held unitary).
226. Compare, e.g., Texas Co. v. Cooper, 236 La. 380, 107 So. 2d 676 (1958), with Superior
Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 406, 386 P.2d 33, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1963). See J.
Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circumscration of Uni-
tary Business, 21 NATL. TAX J. 487, 496-503 (1968).
227. See Boren, Separate Accounting in California and Uniformity in Apportioning Corpo-
rate Income, 18 UCLA L. REv. 478, 494-96 (1971); Keesling, A current look at the combined
report and unformity in allocation practices, 42 J. TAX. 106, 109 (1975).
228. As, for example, in Pennsylvania and Minnesota. See notes 212 & 215 supra.
229. See text at notes 166-67 supra.
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asserted that Vermont's power to tax an apportioned share of Mo-
bil's dividend income subjected that income to the risk of multiple
taxation because of the power of the state of Mobil's commercial
domicile to tax all such income. Exxon asserted that the power of
Wisconsin to tax an apportioned share of Exxon's exploration and
production income230 subjected that income to the risk of multiple
taxation because of the power of the states where the exploration and
production occurred to tax all such income. Just as Mobil had in-
sisted that the commerce clause therefore required that all of its divi-
dend income be allocated to the state of its commercial domicile to
avoid the risk of multiple taxation, so Exxon insisted that the com-
merce clause required that all of its exploration and production in-
come be allocated to the states where the exploration and production
occurred to avoid a comparable risk.23 1
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court rejected Exxon's commerce
clause argument, largely for the reasons set forth in Mobil. The
Court entertained the claim, as it had in Mobil, even though the tax-
payer was relying on the risk rather than the actuality of multiple
taxation.2 32 But, as in Mobil, the Court chose apportionment rather
than allocation of the income from the unitary business when forced
to choose between the two as a matter of constitutional law. Track-
ing its reasoning in Mobil, the Court in Exxon declared:
Presumably, the States in which appellant's crude oil and gas produc-
tion is located are permitted to tax in some manner the income derived
from that production, there being an obvious nexus between the tax-
payer and those States. However, "there is no reason in theory why
that power should be exclusive when the [exploration and production
income as distinguished through separate functional accounting] re-
flect[s] income from a unitary business, part of which is conducted in
other States. In that situation, the income bears relation to benefits and
privileges conferred by several States. These are the circumstances in
which apportionment is ordinarily the accepted method. 2 33
The Court's preference for apportionment over allocation has
implications not only for states seeking to tax an apportioned share
of a taxpayer's income (or particular income items) but also for
states seeking to tax all such income (or such income items). If the
Supreme Court permits Vermont to tax an apportioned share of Mo-
bil's dividend income and Wisconsin an apportioned share of Ex-
230. As identified by its separate functional accounting. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
Dept. of Revenue, 100 S. Ct. 2109, 2123 (1980).
231. See I00 S. Ct. at 2122-23.
232. 100 S. Ct. 2123; see text at notes 109-29 supra.
233. 100 S. Ct. at 2123 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425,
445-46 (1980) (brackets in original)).
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xon's exploration and production income, it follows that New York
may tax no more than an apportioned share of Mobil's dividend in-
come and Alaska or Texas no more than an apportioned share of
Exxon's exploration and production income 34 - assuming that the
Court continues to hold the risk rather than the fact of multiple taxa-
tion to be the governing principle. Moreover, the same analysis
would apply to other income items over which there is currently de-
bate about whether they are apportionable or allocable - such as
interest,235 patent and copyright royalties, 236 and capital gains 237 -
in the event that they were ultimately held to be apportionable.
In light of the constitutional challenges rejected by the Court in
Mobil and Exxon,238 the expansiveness of the Court's view of state
taxing power seems clear. Mobil, on one hand, held that a state can
apply formulary apportionment to foreign source dividends from
subsidiaries and affiliates of a nondomiciliary corporation engaged
in a unitary business in the state. On the other hand, it did not con-
sider the alleged unfairness of the particular apportionment at issue,
thus leaving the states with the broad leeway they have traditionally
exercised in apportioning corporate income. Exxon, on one hand,
held that a state's application of a three-factor apportionment
formula to the operating income of a unitary business is virtually
unimpeachable by the taxpayer's separate accounting evidence. On
the other hand, the Court failed to define the constitutional limits to
the unitary business principle, thus leaving the states free to apply
fair apportionment methods to very loosely connected enterprises.
The Court's failure to articulate more rigorous restraints on state tax-
ing authority may well encourage Congress to enact restrictions of its
own, the subject of part III of this Article.
234. In Alaska, these implications are not merely hypothetical. See ALASKA STAT.
§§ 43.21.010-120 (Supp. 1979), which is presently under constitutional attack in the Alaska
courts. 58 STATE AND LOCAL TAXEs (All State Unit) (Report Bulletin) (P-H) T 17.8 (Oct. 21,
1980).
235. See, e.g., Quails v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 266 Ark. 207, 585 S.W.2d 18 (1979).
236. See, e.g., American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commn., 99 Idaho 924,
592 P.2d 39 (1979), vacated and remanded sub nom. Asarco, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commn.,
100 S. Ct. 1223 (1980) (remanded for further consideration in light of Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980)).
237. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Administration,
115 N.H. 428, 343 A.2d 221 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1069 (1976).
238. A week after its decision in Exxon, the Court dismissed an appeal in a case virtually
identical to the one it had just decided, except that it arose in South Carolina. Exxon Corp. v.
South Carolina Tax Comnn., - S.C. -, 258 S.E.2d 93 (1979), appeal dismissed, 100 S. Ct.
3005 (1980).
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III. H.R. 5076: PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION RESTRICTING
STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME
Ever since 1959, when Congress first imposed limitations on the
states' power to tax interstate commerce, 239 the promise of further
federal intervention in the state tax field240 has remained largely un-
fulfilled. 24' The oft-told tale of congressional fits and starts over pro-
posed legislation bears no repeating here.242 As indicated at the
outset, 243 however, recent developments, including the Court's deci-
sions in Mobil and Exxon, may set the stage for federal legislation
significantly limiting state tax power.
The legislative proposal that has recently generated the most in-
terest is H.R. 5076244 and its Senate counterpart, S. 1688.245 The
proposal differs from other recent bills246 because it is directed only
at state taxation of foreign source income.247 It imposes two distinct
limitations on the power of the states to tax foreign source income or
to consider such income in their taxing schemes.248 First, it generally
prevents states levying corporate income taxes from taking into ac-
239. See note 3 supra.
240. At the time that it enacted Pub. L. No. 86-272 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976)), see
note 11 supra, Congress directed committees of the Senate and House to undertake
complete studies of all matters pertaining to the taxation by the States of income derived
within the States from the conduct of business activities ... which are part of interstate
commerce, for the purpose of recommending to the Congress proposed legislation provid-
ing uniform standards to be observed by the States in imposing income taxes on income
so derived.
Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, § 201, 73 Stat. 556 (repealed 1976). The result was
the extensive and invaluable four-volume Willis Committee Report. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964); H.R. REP. Nos. 565 & 952, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965).
241. See note 3 supra.
242. The history is reviewed in W. Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the
Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REv. 149,
151-54 (1976), and in the sources cited therein. For more recent developments, see House
.Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4; Senate Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra
note 4; Interstate Taxation: Hearings on S, 2173 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. (1977-1978); Tax Treaty Hearings, supra note 5.
243. See text at notes 1-14 supra.
244. 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
245. 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). For ease of reference, the legislative proposal will be
referred to hereafter solely by reference to the House bill number, and references to hearings
on the proposal will be solely to the hearing on the House Bill, House Foreign Source Income
Hearing, supra note 4, which was identical in substance to the hearing on the Senate bill.
Senate Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4.
246. See S. 983, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); H.R. 5, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); S. 2173,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
247. See note 284 infra and accompanying text.
248. H.R. 5076 provides:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That (a) chapter 77 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
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count the income of any foreign corporation affiliated with a corpo-
ration that is taxable in the state, unless such income is subject to
federal income tax.2 49 Second, it restricts the states' power to levy
corporate income taxes on dividends received from foreign corpora-
tions or from domestic corporations whose income derives largely
(relating to miscellaneous provisions) is amended by adding-at the end thereof the follow-
ing new section:
§ 7518. Income of corporations attributable to foreign corporations.
(a) In general. - For purposes of imposing an income tax on any corporation, no
State, or political subdivision thereof, may take into account, or include in income subject
to such tax, any amount of income of, or attributable to, any foreign corporation which is
a member of any affiliated group of corporations which includes both such corporations
unless such amount is includable in the gross income of such corporation for purposes of
chapter 1 (including any amount includable in gross income under subpart F or part III of
subchapter N of chapter 1) for the taxable year in which or with which the taxable period
(for purposes of State or local law) ends.
(b) Income tax defined. - For purposes of this section, the term "income tax"
means any tax which is imposed on, according to, or measured by income.
(c) Affiliated group defined. - For purposes of subsection (a), the term "affili-
ated group" means a common parent corporation and one or more chains of corporations
connected through stock ownership with such common parent corporation.
(d) Certain corporations treated as foreign corporations. - For the purpose of
this section, a domestic corporation shall be treated as a foreign corporation if under
section 861(a)(2)(A) a dividend received from such corporation in the taxable year re-
ferred to in subsection (a) would not be treated as income from sources within the United
States.
(e) Certain dividends paid or deemed paid. -
(1) Dividends excluded from tax. - If a corporation receives in any taxable year a
dividend from a foreign corporation (or is by application of section 951 treated as having
received such a dividend), in imposing an income tax on such corporation no State, or
political subdivision thereof, may tax, or otherwise take into account -
(A) in the case of a dividend received from a corporation described in subsection (d)
the amount of the deduction allowed by section 243 or the amount not taken into account
in determining the tax liability of an affiliated group of corporations in accordance witl
section 1502, or /
(B) in the case of a dividend to which subparagraph (A) does not apply, more than
the lesser of -
(i) the amount of the dividend (exclusive of any amount determined under section
78), or
(ii) the amount by which the dividend plus any amount determined under section 78
exceeds the excluded portion of the dividend determined in accordance with paragraph
(2).
(2) Excluded portion of a dividend. - The excluded portion of any dividend shall be
determined by multiplying the amount of the dividend (including any amount determined
under section 78) by a fraction -
(A) the numerator of the fraction shall be the sum of -
(i) the total amount of tax withheld from all such dividends at the source, and
(ii) the total amount of tax which by application of section 902 or section 960 to all
such dividends, the domestic corporation is deemed to have paid.
(B) The denominator of the fraction shall be 46 percent of all such dividends. For
the purposes of this section, only a tax for which a credit against tax would be allowed
under section 901 (determined without regard to the limitation in section 904) shall be
taken into account.
(b) Effective date. - The amendment made by this section shall apply to taxable
periods (for purposes of State or local law) beginning after December 31, 1978.
(c) Amendment of the table of sections. - The table of sections for chapter 77 of
such Code is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:
Sec. 7518. Income of corporations attributable to foreign corporations.
249. H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. § (a) (1979) (new I.R.C. § 7518(a)-(d)).
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from foreign sources.250 Because bills similar to H.R. 5076 are very
likely to be introduced in the current session of Congress, and be-
cause H.R. 5076 not only revises the holding in Mobil but also
greatly restricts state taxation of foreign source income, it is appro-
priate to consider the proposed legislation in light of the issues that
have been examined above.
A. H.A 5076: Prohibiting Worldwide Combination
H.R. 5076 generally forbids a state from taking into account the
income of foreign affiliates of corporations taxable in that state un-
less such income is subject to federal income tax.25' It is no secret
that this provision is directed at the method of reporting income for
corporate tax purposes, now employed by California and several
other states, which requires that the income of foreign affiliates of a
corporation taxable in the state be included in the total income sub-
ject to apportionment if the activities of the corporations are part of
a unitary business. 252 This method of reporting is generally referred
to as worldwide combination: combination, because all of the income
and apportionment factors of the corporations carrying on a unitary
business are combined (and intercompany items eliminated) for tax
purposes; worldwide, because the combination does not stop at the
water's edge.253
By prohibiting the states from taking account of foreign affiliate
income unless such income is subject to federal taxation, H.R. 5076
effectively precludes the states' use of worldwide combination. For
state tax purposes, the worldwide combined tax base of an affiliated
group of corporations embraces the foreign source income of foreign
members of the group. The federal tax laws, by contrast, generally
do not subject foreign source income of foreign corporations to taxa-
tion. There are limited exceptions to the federal rule of nontaxabil-
ity of such income,254 but H.R. 5076, if enacted, would accomplish
250. H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § (a) (1979) (new I.R.C. § 7518(d)-(e)).
251. H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § (a) (1979) (new I.R.C. § 7518(a)).
252. See Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4,passim. For a review of the back-
ground to the controversy, the development of California's approach to the unitary business
problem, and the use of the combined report in apportioning the income of multicorporate
enterprises, see J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 512-14, 520-24, 537-43.
253. It was this method that Mobil suggested was available to Vermont if the State wished
to tax Mobil properly on a unitary basis. See text at notes 56-57 supra.
254. Foreign source income of foreign corporations is subject to federal income tax when it
is distributed as a dividend to a domestic shareholder, I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(7), 63(a), or when it is
included in the tax base of a domestic corporation under the special rules governing foreign
tax havens, I.R.C. §§ 951-964 (subpart F), or under the rules governing allocation of income
among related entities to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect income. I.R.C. § 482.
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its framers' objective of putting an end to worldwide combination as
it is presently employed by the states.255
Supporters of H.R. 5076 advance a number of reasons for the
proposed limitation on state taxing authority. First, they contend
that, however appropriate the unitary business principle and the
combined report may be for enterprises carrying on business exclu-
sively within the United States, extending the unitary concept to for-
eign income earned by foreign entities creates substantial distortions
in the income attribution process. Given the dramatic differences
between domestic and foreign property values, wage rates, and sales
margins, supporters of the bill argue that lumping together foreign
and domestic property, payroll and sales factors into a single
formula for apportioning the aggregate income of the combined
group does not fairly represent the income earned in a particular
jurisdiction.256 For example, if wage rates in California are signifi-
cantly higher than analogous wage rates in foreign jurisdictions, the
use of a worldwide payroll factor may apportion an excessive
amount of income to California, assuming that the different wage
rates do not reflect different levels of productivity. Moreover, sup-
porters assert, because the levels of risk are often higher abroad than
in the United States, the relationships of property, payroll and sales
to income are not uniform on a global basis.257 They claim that for-
mulary apportionment (on which worldwide combination depends)
relies on an underlying premise that equal wage rates, property and
sales in two areas produce the same profits; if unit labor and unit
property costs in the United States are higher than in foreign taxing
jurisdictions because of lower risk, worldwide combination results in
the attribution of a disproportionately large amount of profits to
American taxing jurisdictions. 258 The result allegedly has been in-
ternational double taxation.259
Second, supporters of H.R. 5076 contend that worldwide combi-
nation imposes intolerable administrative burdens on multinational
business. Under prevailing international standards for dividing the
255. Dividends from a foreign affiliate will normally be eliminated from the combined
state tax base as an intercompany item, and subpart F, I.R.C. §§ 951-964, and I.R.C. § 482
provide only limited exceptions to the general federal rule of nontaxability of a foreign corpo-
ration's foreign source income.
256. See, e.g., House Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4, at 165 (statement of
Paul W. Cook on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers).
257. See, e.g., id. at 259-60 (statement of William 0. Hetts, partner, Deloitte Haskins &
Sells).
258. See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 16, at 539.
259. See, e.g., House Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4, at 315 (statement of
Joseph H. Guttentag on behalf of the Dutch Employers' Federation).
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income of an affiliated group of corporations, the separate identities
of the different members of the group are respected. This practice is
generally followed under section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code,
as well. 260 The different format required by the state for purposes of
its combined report, which does not respect separate corporate iden-
ties, thus requires taxpayers annually to conform the financial
records of sometimes numerous corporate affiliates to the states' re-
quirements, a task that may be overwhelming. 261 Providing infor-
mation unavailable from existing records262 or protected from
disclosure under the law of a foreign country263 raises additional dif-
ficulties, as does the necessity of making foreign currency transla-
tions.264
Third, worldwide combination is, according to its critics, a signif-
icant international irritant. For the reasons just mentioned, foreign
businessmen and their national representatives perceive it as analyti-
cally indefensible, contrary to accepted international standards of in-
come attribution, a source of administrative nightmares, and a basis
of gross overreaching by state taxing authorities.265 This purportedly
produces international tension,266 creates risks of foreign retalia-
tion,267 and threatens losses in foreign investment in the United
States.268
260. See, e.g., id. at 4 (statement of Hon. Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Tax Policy). Under prevailing international and federal standards, the separate
status of separately incorporated entities is generally respected for tax purposes. Section 482 of
the Internal Revenue Code provides, however, for reallocation of income among related enti-
ties when necessary "to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income" of any such
entity. I.R.C. § 482. Pursuant to this section and the elaborate Treasury regulations issued
thereunder, attributing an appropriate share of income to each member of an affiliated group
of corporations is achieved by comparing transactions between members of the affiliated
group with transactions that would have occurred at arm's length between independent entities
operating in the open market. See generally Note, Multinational Corporations and Income ,411o-
cation Under Section 482 ofthe Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1202 (1976).
261. See, e.g., House Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4, at 196 (statement of
Thomas P. Maletta, Vice President - Taxes, Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc.).
262. See, e.g., id. at 368 (letter from Donald K. Frick, Chairman, Committee on Taxation,
Financial Executives Institute).
263. See, e.g., id. at 226 (statement of Kirby A. Scott, Director of Taxes, Capitol Industries
- EMI, Inc.).
264. See, e.g., id. at 348 (statement of J. Robert Vastine, Chairman, Legislative Committee,
California Council for International Trade).
265. See, e.g., id. at 285-308 (statement of John S. Nolan, Counsel, on behalf of the Con-
federation of British Industry and the British National Committee of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce).
266. See, e.g., id. at 316 (statement of Connie Borken-Hagen, Special Coordinator for the
American Chamber of Commerce in the United Kingdom).
267. See, e.g., id. at 182 (statement of James W. McGrath, Director, Domestic Tax Law,
R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc.).
268. See, e.g., id. at 179 (statement of Charles S. Levy, Vice President, Emergency Com-
mittee for American Trade).
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Worldwide combination has its champions, however. Opponents
of H.R. 5076 assert that the application of the unitary business con-
cept and the combined report on a worldwide basis is simply the
logical extension of basic principles that underlie state apportion-
ment methods. 269 They claim that imposition of federal income at-
tribution criteria upon the states would not only violate fundamental
precepts of federalism 270 but would also substitute the theoretically
deficient and administratively unworkable federal arm's-length stan-
dards of section 482 for the simple, accurate, and equitable methods
traditionally employed by the states. 271 They decry the loss in state
revenues that H.R. 5076 would allegedly cause,272 and they caution
that the bill would permit multinational corporations to avoid full
accountability to the jurisdictions in which the corporations earn
their income.273 Supporters of worldwide combination challenge
business spokesmen to produce real and widespread rather than hy-
pothetical and isolated examples of overtaxation resulting from
worldwide combination.2 74 As for the distortion allegedly produced
by combining apportionment factors on a global basis, defenders of
worldwide combination contend: "[N]obody has made a study. And
nobody can really determine the amount of income that should be
attributed to the United States because of U.S. know-how, whether it
is management, patents, or copyrights."2 75 In short, proponents of
worldwide combination view H.R. 5076 as "vicious, special interest
legislation. . . [that] would greatly restrict the ability of the states to
impose fair and equitable taxes on corporations.
2 76
Resolution of the issues surrounding worldwide combination will
not be easy. The debate is likely to be shaped by an extensive Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) report on state and federal taxation
of multijurisdictional corporations, a report under preparation as
269. See, e.g., id. at 52-53 (statement of James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel, Califor-
nia State Franchise Tax Board).
270. See, e.g., id. at 361 (letter from Thomas K. Williams, Commissioner, State of Alaska
Department of Revenue).
27 1. See, e.g., id. at 28-29 (statement of William D. Dexter, General Counsel, the Multi-
state Tax Commission).
272. See, e.g., id. at 48 (statement of James B. Zagel, Director, Department of Revenue,
State of Illinois).
273. See, e.g., id. at 19 (statement of Byron Dorgan, Past Chairman, Multistate Tax Com-
mission and Tax Commissioner, State of North Dakota).
274. See, e.g., id. at 34 (statement of Kenneth Cory, State Controller, California Franchise
Tax Board).
275. Id. at 37 (statement of Theodore W. de Looze, Chief Tax Counsel, Department of
Justice, State of Oregon).
276. Id. at 383 (letter from Frank M. Keesling, Loeb & Loeb).
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this Article goes to press. 277 The report will shed light on the relative
merits of formulary apportionment versus separate accounting as a
means of dividing the income of multinational corporations on a
global basis; the extent of undertaxation or overtaxation resulting
from existing approaches to income attribution; and the administra-
tive burdens, from both compliance and enforcement standpoints,
associated with state and federal methods of attributing the income
of multijurisdictional corporations. Detailed analysis of the issues
raised by any legislative proposal affecting state taxation of interstate
or foreign commerce should therefore await the enlightenment that
the GAO report should provide. Nevertheless, some general obser-
vations regarding the debate over H.R. 5076's prohibition on world-
wide combination are appropriate.
First, Congress should start from the premise that, absent some
pressing need for federal intervention in this area, the states should
be free to go their own way. Our constitutional system contemplates
concurrent state and federal taxation, with considerable latitude ac-
corded to the states in this domain.278 There is nothing in the consti-
tutional plan to suggest that adoption by the federal government of a
particular mode of taxation creates a duty on the states to follow in
its footsteps.279 A proper respect for the role of the states in the
federal system counsels congressional restraint in imposing such a
duty on the states. Although it possesses the constitutional power to
do so, 280 Congress should not require the states to conform to the
federal model merely because it has selected a different method of
taxation or a different tax policy than the states. Rather, Congress
should tolerate diversity except where compelling considerations,
such as the need to avoid international conflict, require conformity
between state and federal taxation schemes.
Second, assuming that worldwide combination is in fact a prob-
lem that demands a federal legislative solution, the cur should be
277. See id. at 356-59 (letter from Allen R. Voss, Director, U.S. General Accounting Of-
fice).
278. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (A. Hamilton); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819) (dictum):
That the power of taxation is one of vital importance; that it is retained by the States; that
it is not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the government of the Union; that it is
to be concurrently exercised by the two governments: are truths which have never been
denied.
279. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980); text at note
158 supra.
280. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979) (Congress can invalidate a
state tax if it has a rational basis for concluding that the state tax interferes with interstate
commerce).
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responsive to the disease. Judging by the "horror cases" 281 that have
been paraded before various congressional committees as proof of
the evils of worldwide combination, 28 2 one might conclude that Cal-
ifornia's overzealous extension of worldwide combination and the
unitary business principle lies at the heart of the international busi-
ness community's concern, 28 3 and that there is nothing intrinsically
wrong with applying the unitary concept globally. If it is the appli-
cation of the unitary concept and worldwide combination to loosely
connected far-flung enterprises that is creating the troublesome
problems, then specific limitations on the states' powers to define
businesses as unitary and to require worldwide combination would
be more appropriate than the blanket prohibition on the states' use
of worldwide combination embodied in H.R. 5076. For example,
Congress might restrict the states' application of worldwide combi-
nation to corporations that are essential to each others' functions284
or that are operationally interdependent.285
Finally, on the continuing assumption that some congressional
action is called for, the complex and interrelated problems associated
with state taxation of interstate and foreign commerce demand a
more comprehensive solution than the piecemeal approach em-
braced by H.R. 5076. The bill's narrowness can be explained in part
by its history: it represents a congressional response to a similar but
even narrower proposal incorporated in a United States - United
Kingdom tax treaty.286 Nonetheless, by attacking only the issue of
281. House Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4, at 5 (statement of Hon. Donald
C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
282. See, e.g., id. at 207-08 (statement of Roy A. Gentles, President, Alcan Aluminum
Corp.); Interstate Taxation: Hearings on S. 2173 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess. 498-502 (1977-1978) (statement of Mark G. Ancel); Tax Treaty
Hearings, supra note 5, at 217-19 (statement of Valentine Brookes, Brookes & Vogl, on behalf
of EMI-Capitol Records, Inc.).
283. There are ongoing efforts in California to enact legislation limiting the state's use of
worldwide combination. See Assembly Bill 525, reproduced and discussed in Senate Forein
Source Income Hearing, supra note 4, at 656-64.
284. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 269 Minn. 351,367-68, 131 N.W.2d
632, 643 (1964).
285. See J. Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Apportionment and the Circumscri-
tion of Unitary Business, 21 NATL. TAX J. 487, 501-03 (1968).
286. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital Gains, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., art. 9(4) (1976); Protocol to the Convention, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976); Second Protocol to the Convention, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 2
P-H Tax Treaties 89,039, 89,061, 89,063. The Senate withheld its consent from the portion
of the treaty limiting state tax power in part on the ground that if such limitations should be
effected at all, they should be effected through the traditional legislative process rather than by
treaty. See House Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4, at 289-90 (statement of John
S. Nolan, Counsel, on behalf of the Confederation of British Industry and the British National
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state taxation of foreign source income insofar as it bears on world-
wide combination and dividends, H.R. 5076 would give rise to a host
of incongruous results and might create as many problems as it
solves. For example, the bill would cause disparate treatment of cor-
porate taxpayers depending on whether they operated abroad
through branches or subsidiaries.287 The bill would also produce in-
consistent treatment of dividends, for which there are special federal
rules, and foreign source income from intangibles other than corpo-
rate stock, for which there are not.288 Especially in light of the GAO
report and the increased attention being given state taxation of mul-
tistate and multinational business, 289 Congress should approach
whatever problems exist in this area by legislation more broadly con-
ceived than H.R. 5076.
B. H. 5076 Limiting State Taxation of
Foreign Source Dividends
In addition to prohibiting worldwide combination, H.R. 5076 re-
stricts the states' power to impose corporate income taxes on foreign
source dividends.290 In substance, the bill imposes upon the states
the federal corporate income tax rules governing the taxation of such
dividends. To evaluate the suitability of the federal model for pur-
poses of state taxation, it will be useful to summarize that model.
To avoid double taxation of income at the corporate level, the
federal tax laws generally permit corporations to deduct 85%, or in
some cases, 100% of the dividends received from other corporations
to the extent that such dividends reflect income that has already
been exposed to federal income taxation.29' This includes dividends
Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce). Thereafter bills were introduced in
both the House and Senate proposing restraints on the states' power to tax foreign source
income that included those sought by the treaty draftsmen. H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); S. 1688, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); see House
Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4, at 290 (statement of John S. Nolan, Counsel, on
behalf of the Confederation of British Industry and the British National Committee of the
International Chamber of Commerce). Efforts to limit worldwide combination by treaty are
by no means dead, however. Treasury Secretary Miller and Canadian Finance Minister
MacEachen agreed in late 1980 by an exchange of notes to reopen the dialogue to find a way to
restrict the states' use of worldwide combination. 58 STATE AND LOCAL TAXES (All States
Unit) (Report Bulletin) (P-H) 18.1 (Oct. 28, 1980).
287. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 440-41 (1980).
288. 445 U.S. at 446.
289. See text at notes 1-8 supra.
290. H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § (a) (1979) (new I.R.C. § 7518(d)-(e)). See note 248
supra.
291. See I.R.C. §§ 243-247, 882; B. BrrKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF COR.PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 5.06 (1979). When a group of affiliated corpo-
rations files a consolidated return pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 1501-1505, and the regulations there-
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received from domestic corporations operating abroad because do-
mestic corporations are subject to federal income tax on their income
from all sources.292 When the payor is a foreign corporation deriv-
ing its income from foreign sources,2 93 its dividends do not reflect
income previously exposed to federal taxation. In this situation,
there is no risk of double taxation under the federal corporate in-
come tax, and no deduction for intercorporate dividends is permit-
ted. Nevertheless, there may be a risk of international double
taxation if the payor corporation has paid income tax to a foreign
country on income distributed as dividends to a payee corporation
subject to federal income taxation. To reduce this risk, the federal
tax laws permit domestic corporations receiving dividends from for-
eign corporations in which they have a 10% ownership interest to
claim a foreign tax credit for foreign income taxes paid by the for-
eign corporations.2 94
In accord with this scheme, H.R. 5076 imposes two separate limi-
tations on the states' power to tax foreign source dividends, one ap-
plying to dividends received from domestic payors, the other to
dividends received from foreign payors. First, the states are forbid-
den from taxing dividends received from domestic corporations
earning less than 20% of their gross income from United States
sources to the extent that such dividends qualify for the intercorpo-
rate dividend deduction under the federal tax laws.2 95 H.R. 5076
would thus permit states to include no more than 15% of such divi-
dends in the payee's tax base and, depending on the degree of own-
ership of the payor by the payee corporation, it would in many cases
deny them the right to take account of such dividends at all. 296 Sec-
ond, H.R. 5076 excludes from the state tax base of a payee corpora-
tion some or all of the dividends received from foreign corporations
if they have been directly or indirectly subjected to foreign income
under, the effect is likewise to eliminate from the corporate income tax base any dividends
paid by any member of the affiliated group to any other member of the group. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1502-14(a)(1) (1972). The statement in the text does not apply to dividend income of for-
eign corporations not connected with United States business, even though the dividends are
received from sources within the United States. I.R.C. § 881. The federal tax on such income
may, however, be reduced or eliminated by treaty. See I.R.C. § 894; B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE
supra, at 17.03.
292. See I.R.C. § 11, 61(a), 63(a).
293. See I.R.C. § 881-882.
294. I.R.C. § 902.
295. H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § (a) (1979) (new I.R.C. § 7518(d)-e(1)(A)); see
I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(A). H.R. 5076 also forbids the states from taking account of dividends elim-
inated from a corporation's federal tax base pursuant to the consolidated return provisions.
See I.R.C. §§ 1501-1505; note 291 supra.
296. See I.R.C. § 243.
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taxes. The amount of the exclusion depends on the ratio of the for-
eign tax rate to the federal tax rate.297 If the rate at which the foreign
income taxes paid or deemed paid298 on the dividends received from
a foreign corporation equals or exceeds the 46% federal tax rate,
299
the dividends would be entirely excluded from the payee's state tax
base. If the rate at which the taxes paid or deemed paid on such
dividends is less than 46%, the dividends would be taxable by the
states only in proportion to the excess of the federal tax rate over the
foreign tax rate.3°° Inasmuch as most American corporations are
subject to a greater than 46% foreign income tax rate on dividends
received from foreign corporations in which they have at least a 10%
ownership interest, 30 the effect of H.R. 5076 would be to exempt
from state taxation the lion's share of dividends that American cor-
porations receive from foreign payors.30 2
It is apparent - if not from the above explanation, then from the
proposal itself 3°3 and the hearings addressed to it3°4 - that there are
interpretative and technical problems raised by H.R. 5076 that need
to be explored in much greater depth than is feasible here before one
can intelligently attempt to evaluate all of its ramifications. For pres-
ent purposes, I shall limit my observations to the impact of H.R.
5076 on the result in Mobil and to the wisdom of the proposed legis-
lation's overall design.
The enactment of H.R. 5076 would significantly affect the way
Vermont, with the Supreme Court's approval, presently taxes the
Mobil Oil Corporation. Although Vermont eschews worldwide
combination 30 5 and thus would be unaffected by the first limitation
embodied in H.R. 5076, the restriction on state taxation of foreign
source dividends would dramatically reduce Mobil's apportionable
tax base for Vermont tax purposes. The vast preponderance of Mo-
bil's foreign source dividends - some 90% or more - are received
from foreign corporations in which Mobil has at least a 10% owner-
297. H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § (a) (1979) (new I.R.C. § 7518(e)(1)(B)-7518(e)(2)).
298. See I.R.C. §§ 901-908.
299. See I.R.C. § 11. The marginal rate reaches 46% only after the surtax exemptions have
been exhausted.
300. This proportion is determined by a complex statutory formula. See H.R. 5076, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. § (a) (1979) (new I.R.C. § 7518(e)(2)).
301. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DEsCRIPTION OF H.R. 5076 RELATING TO
STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE CORPORATE INCOME 19 (Joint Comm. Print 1980).
302. Id. at 19-20.
303. See note 248 supra.
304. See House Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4, passim; Senate Foreign
Source Income Hearing, supra note 4,passim.
305. See text following note 60 supra.
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ship interest.30 6 On the reasonable assumption that Mobil pays or is
deemed to pay foreign income taxes on such dividends at rates com-
parable to 46%,307 all such dividends would be excluded from Mo-
bil's apportionable tax base in Vermont. As to Mobil's foreign
source dividends from domestic corporations, H.R. 5076 would leave
Vermont's present taxing scheme intact. Because Vermont conforms
to the federal corporate income tax rules regarding the deduction for
intercorporate dividends,30 8 the State is now taking account of for-
eign source dividends from domestic corporations in precisely the
manner that H.R. 5076 permits.30 9
The impact of H.R. 5076 on other states would depend on how
they treat foreign source dividends for corporate income tax pur-
poses. The states treat such dividends in a variety of ways.310 For
example, there are substantial variations in the extent to which the
states follow the federal rules governing the intercorporate dividend
deduction, 31' and some states do not tax foreign source dividends at
all.312 However, since thirty-eight of the forty-five states with corpo-
rate income taxes do tax foreign source dividends,313 and the state
revenue produced is in the billions of dollars,314 H.R. 5076 would
have a major impact on state taxation.
The question remains whether these constraints are warranted.
In striking contrast to the multifaceted and anguished pleas for leg-
islative relief from burdens of worldwide combination, the case for
restricting state taxation of foreign source dividends is more limited
and restrained. 315 The two principal reasons advanced for confining
306. Appendix to the Court's opinion at A75-76, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of
Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
307. See text at note 301 supra.
308. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5811(18), 5832 (Supp. 1979).
309. The importance of this source of Mobil's income has been substantially reduced by its
sale of its 10% interest in the Arab American Oil Company, which was responsible for nearly
all of Mobil's foreign source dividends from domestic corporations. Appendix to the Court's
opinion at A76, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
310. See House Foreign Source Income Hearing, supra note 4, at 357 (statement of Allen R.
Voss, Director, U.S. General Accounting Office).
311. For example, whereas Vermont adopts the federal rules, see note 308 supra, Califor-
nia generally permits a deduction only for dividends from income already taxed by California,
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 24402 (West 1979), and Kentucky does not include dividends in the
tax base at all. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(12)(b) (Bobbs-Merrill 1970).
312. See note 310 supra.
313. Id.
314. It has been estimated that foreign source dividends in the amounts of $2.2 billion
from subsidiaries and $520 million from nonsubsidiaries were included in the states' tax base
in 1972. Carlson, State Taxation of Corporate Income from Foreign Sources, in ESsAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: 1976, at 231, 266 (U.S. Dept. of Treasury).
315. Indeed, many of the witnesses testifying in support of H.R. 5076 failed to mention the
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the states' power are, first, that the states have not contributed to the
production of the income underlying the dividends and therefore are
not justified in taxing them,316 and, second, that permitting the states
to tax such dividends beyond the extent to which the dividends are
subjected to federal income taxation violates federal policy against
international double taxation.317 The first proposition is a non se-
quitur and the second is predicated on a spurious analogy between
the federal and state tax systems.
There is no legal foundation for the contention that a jurisdic-
tion's right to tax dividends received by a payee depends on the con-
nection of the jurisdiction to the production of the income
underlying the dividend. Dividend income and operating income
have traditionally been treated as distinct items of taxable income,3 18
and the power to tax the latter has never been a constitutional predi-
cate of the power to tax the former.319 Indeed, in pressing its claim
before the Supreme Court that Vermont lacked the power to tax its
foreign source dividends, Mobil did not rely on the broad proposi-
tion now urged by proponents of H.R. 5076. Rather, Mobil relied on
the narrower proposition that Vermont lacked the power because it
was not the state of Mobil's commercial domicile.320 Mobil con-
ceded that New York had the power to tax its dividends without
regard to New York's relationship to the operating income underly-
ing the dividends. Dividend income has traditionally been attrib-
uted to states for income tax purposes based on commercial
domicile, business situs 321 and other theories, without regard to oper-
ating income.
Needless to say, Congress is not bound to traditional legal doc-
trine if sound policy dictates otherwise. And there may well be
sound policy reasons, as Mobil unsuccessfully argued to the
foreign source dividend limitations altogether. See, e.g., House Foreign Source Income Hear-
ing, supra note 4, at 209-13 (statement of Robert E. Dillon, Jr., Senior Vice President, Finance,
Sony Corporation of America).
316. See, e.g., id. at 162 (statement of Ernest S. Christian, Jr., Counsel, Committee on State
Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce).
317. See, e.g., id. at 150 (statement of Charles W. Wheeler, Senior Tax Attorney, Chamber
of Commerce of the United States).
318. See, e.g., 2 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 168 (1980).1
319. See Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction of Income for Tax Purposes, 44 HARv. L. REv.
1075, 1094-95 (1931).
320. See text at notes 105-08 supra.
321. Under the business situs doctrine, intangibles "may acquire a situs for taxation other
than that of the owner if they have become integral parts of some local business." Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204,213 (1930). See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLER-
STEIN, supra note 16, at 441-42.
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Supreme Court, for allocating all of the corporation's dividends to
the state of the corporation's commercial domicile rather than appor-
tioning the dividends among the different states where the corpora-
tion carries on various operating activities.322 Moreover, if dividends
are apportioned among the states, there are strong arguments for re-
quiring a state that is empowered to tax an apportioned share of a
corporation's dividends to adjust its apportionment formula to re-
flect the fact that it is taxing dividends and not operating income.323
But H.R. 5076, consistently with the rationale offered by its support-
ers, goes far beyond such measures. It excludes a substantial portion
of a corporation's foreign source dividends from any state tax base,
and would thus prevent New York as well as Vermont from taxing
almost all foreign source dividends that Mobil receives. 324 This limi-
tation is contrary to tradition and precedent as well as federal tax
policy, which is generally to tax all dividends from whatever source
derived.325
The second justification advanced for H.R. 5076's limitation on
state taxation of foreign source dividends is that it is necessary to
carry out established federal policy against international double tax-
ation. The thesis is that the states violate the policy when they tax
foreign source dividends to a greater extent than the federal govern-
ment, and the appropriate remedy is to impose upon the states ex-
isting federal limitations on the effective taxation of such
dividends. 326 The premise underlying this argument is that the
problems of international double taxation at the national level are
the same as the problems of international double taxation at the state
level. Because this premise is false, legislation predicated on it is
seriously flawed.
The problem of international double taxation arises at the na-
tional level because the federal government has the power to tax a
domestic corporation's entire global income. As a result, the federal
322. A corporation's commercial domicile might be selected as the state with sole authority
to tax the corporation's dividends to assure uniformity of treatment that may not be achieved
through apportionment, or because the state of commercial domicile enjoys a more direct rela-
tionship with those dividends than do other states in which the corporation would otherwise be
taxable.
323. See text at notes 85-92 supra.
324. See text at notes 297-302 & 305-07 supra.
325. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a)(7), 63(a). While the federal tax code ultimately modifies its
sweeping stance toward inclusion of dividends in the tax base to minimize double federal
taxation of corporate income and international double taxation of income, see I.R.C. §§ 243,
901-908, these considerations should in fact have little bearing on state tax policy for the rea-
sons discussed immediately below.
326. See text at notes 291-300 supra.
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government may tax income that has its source in a foreign jurisdic-
tion and that is taxed by the foreign jurisdiction. The two federal
income tax devices noted earlier - the intercorporate dividend de-
duction where the payor is a domestic corporation,327 and the for-
eign tax credit where the payor is a foreign corporation328 - are
necessary to prevent such duplicative taxation of foreign source divi-
dends.
The problem of international double taxation that exists at the
national level cannot, at least in principle, arise at the state level be-
cause the states, unlike the federal government, generally lack the
power to tax domestic corporations on their global income. State
power to tax multijurisdictional corporations has always been con-
strained by the commerce and due process clauses.329 These consti-
tutional strictures forbid the states from taxing any income -
including foreign source dividends330 - that is not fairly attribut-
able to activities carried on within their borders. To be sure, the
reality may not perfectly fit the theory. The various division-of-in-
come methods actually chosen by the states under the constitutional
mandate to tax only a fair share of a corporation's income may be
inconsistent with methods employed by other jurisdictions to divide
such income, 331 with resulting double taxation. And federal legisla-
tion designed to deal with this problem may well be appropriate. 332
But H.R. 5076 does not respond to this problem. Rather, it re-
sponds to the problem of international double taxation at the state
level on the false assumption that it is identical to the problems at
the national level. And the results are analytically indefensible.
Thus H.R. 5076 imposes the federal intercorporate dividend deduc-
tion rule upon the states with respect to dividends received from do-
mestic corporations whose income is largely from foreign sources.
This rule was designed to deal with the problem of double taxation
of corporate income by the federal government itself 333 though it
may incidentally solve the problem of international double taxation
327. I.R.C. § 243; see text at notes 291-92 supra.
328. I.R.C. §§ 901-908; see text at notes 293-94 supra.
329. See text at notes 34-39 supra.
330. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
331. See text at notes 109-29 supra; cf. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434 (1979) (property taxation case holding that even properly apportioned state property
taxation of instrumentalities used in foreign commerce can create an impermissible risk of
multiple taxation when the instrumentalities are also taxed by a foreign jurisdiction) (discussed
in text at notes 143-55 supra).
332. See, e.g., text at notes 85-96 supra.
333. See Schaffer, The Income Tax on Intercorporate Dipidends, 33 TAx LAW. 161, 162
(1979).
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at the national level.334 At the state level it deals with neither prob-
lem satisfactorily. If one wished to solve at the state level the prob-
lem that is equivalent to double taxation of corporate income by the
federal government, one would only forbid a state from taxing divi-
dends arising out of income that the state has already taxed as in-
come to the payor corporation. Indeed, a number of states, although
not Vermont, have adopted such an approach to the taxation of cor-
porate dividends.335
Moreover, H.R. 5076 is unresponsive to the issue of international
double taxation at the state level. If a state is apportioning income,
including foreign source dividends, by a formula that accurately re-
flects the sources underlying that income (which is presumably the
method that states will be required to follow after Mobil336), limiting
the state's tax base to a maximum of 15% of such dividends is unwar-
ranted. The federal limitation may in some rough sense be a justifi-
able antidote to the apportionment of dividends by a formula that
failed to reflect their contribution to a taxpayer's income. (Such an
apportionment was sustained by the Supreme Court in Mobil .337) If,
however, one believes that the Court will ultimately require a fair
apportionment of such dividends, as I do, then there is no warrant
for excluding the foreign source dividends from the taxpayer's ap-
portionable tax base.
Nor can the limitation on state taxation of foreign source divi-
dends received from foreign corporations be defended as a matter of
sound tax policy. As noted above,338 H.R. 5076 prohibits the state
taxation of such dividends if the foreign taxes borne by the dividends
(or the income underlying them) give rise to a federal foreign tax
credit. But the federal foreign tax credit is designed to avoid dupli-
cative taxation at the national level of earnings derived from sources
outside the United States.339 It has - or should have - no bearing
on the power of a state to tax such income. State income taxes have
always been imposed in addition to federal income taxes. Indeed, as
the Supreme Court noted in Mobil, "[c]oncurrent federal and state
taxation of income, of course, is a well-established norm. ' 340 While
334. See text at notes 291-92 & 327 supra.
335. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAx CODE § 24402 (West 1979).
336. See text at notes 82-104 supra.
337. See text following note 64 supra.
338. See text at notes 297-300 supra.
339. See, e.g., D. TILLINGHAST, TAX ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS § 2.1 at
35-37 (1978).
340. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 448 (1980).
November 1980]
Michigan Law Review
stated as a principle of constitutional adjudication, the statement is
relevant as well to federal policy toward state taxation. Federal pol-
icy should be sensitive to the existence of the independent taxing
powers of the states out of respect for the independent role of the
states in our federal system. By contrast, H.R. 5076 restrains state
taxing authority over foreign source dividends without regard to the
relationship of the state to those dividends, thus ignoring the predi-
cate on which state tax authority is based. Furthermore, under H.R.
5076 state tax power over foreign source dividends would expand or
contract depending on the foreign tax rate to which such dividends
or the income underlying them had been exposed, a factor that is
extraneous to whether a state is taxing its fair share of such divi-
dends. In short, while the problems raised by state taxation of for-
eign source dividends may warrant federal legislative
intervention,341 they do not warrant limitations like those embodied
in H.R. 5076. The relief from international double taxation that the
federal government provides to domestic corporations - all of
whose income is subject to federal taxation - when some of their
income is also subject to foreign taxation, carries with it no implied
prescription for relief from state taxation, which is limited to income
fairly attributable to the state and has always coexisted with taxation
at the national level.
In summary, H.R. 5076 is an overreaction to the problem of state
taxation of multinational corporations. First, the bill responds to the
Court's failure to delimit the constitutional contours of a unitary
business by effectively prohibiting application of the unitary business
principle to international multicorporate enterprises, rather than by
defining statutory limits that would prevent overzealous state taxa-
tion of loosely connected corporations. It confines the application of
the unitary business principle by imposing the federal tax scheme on
the states. Yet imposing the federal approach may be inconsistent
with principles of federalism and may create incongruous results and
problems of its own. Second, H.R. 5076 deals with the difficulties
that may be involved in establishing constitutional standards to en-
sure the fairness of apportionment formulas applied to foreign
source dividends by simply exempting most foreign source dividends
from state taxation, rather than by imposing statutory requirements
of fairness. It would accomplish this by again imposing the federal
tax model on the states. Such a limitation misconceives the problem
341. See text at notes 331-32 supra.
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of international double taxation at the state level and is, once again,
inconsistent with principles of federalism.
CONCLUSION
In Mobil and Exxon, state taxing authorities took on two of the
nation's three largest industrial corporations 342 and emerged from
the judicial arena with resounding victories. The Supreme Court
emphatically reaffirmed the states' broad power to tax multistate and
multinational business and stressed its own limited role in keeping
these powers within constitutional bounds. The Court repeated its
standing invitation to Congress to legislate in the state tax field if it is
unhappy with the results of the Court's decisions.343 Perhaps this
time Congress will accept that invitation and dramatically reshape
the restraints on state taxation of multijurisdictional enterprise.
Should Congress be so inclined, it should fashion a solution more
responsive than H.R. 5076 to the problems it perceives; a solution
that, unlike H.R. 5076, does not needlessly trench on the states' tax-
ing authority.
342. See notes 32 & 165 supra.
343. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 449 (1980).
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